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THE SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
MOVEMENT, A HISTORY AND PROGNOSIS:
WILL MASSACHUSETTS JOIN THE THIRD
WAVE OF REFORM?
Ensuring equal educational opportunity for all children
has long been a cherished American ideal.' Since the early days of
our republic, the people of the United States have recognized that
free public education is one of the most important ways in which
our country fulfills its promise of equal opportunity for all
citizens. 2 Public schools have traditionally served as a means by
which the immigrant and the disadvantaged are able to enter the
mainstream of our society. 3 Public schools have provided both
a way to ensure equal opportunity for the individual, as
well as a means to strengthen and unify our country. 4
Because of the importance of this dual role of education in
our democratic society, a key goal of public education in the
United States has been to provide quality schooling for all
children. 5
Although few Americans would quarrel with the ideal of equal
educational opportunity, not all would define the concept in the
same way. 6 The initial interpretation of this evolving concept iden-
tified equal educational opportunity with overcoming inequalities
in schooling stemming from racial discrimination.? PropOrients
of this interpretation, which dominated the first half of this cen-
tury, focused initially on the provision of equal services and facil-
ities to all children regardless of race. 8 By 1950, this concept
Browning & Long, School Finance Reform and the Courts after Rodriguez [hereinafter
School Finance Reform], hi SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION, THE COURTS AND EDUCATIONAL
REFORM 82 (1974).
2 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS I
(1967) [hereinafter RACIAL ISOLATION].
' Id.
4 Id.
' Id. at ix.
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of equal educational opportunity also emphasized the need for
schools to be equal in terms of intangible factors such as morale
and prestige. 9
During the 1960s, a second interpretation of the concept of
equality of educational opportunity emerged.° This interpretation
focused on the output of education, or on equalizing the educational
achievement of various societal groups." A third interpretation of
the concept of equal educational opportunity emphasizes the equal-
ization of the financial input into a child's education. 12 The focus
under this definition is on equalizing such factors as teachers' sala-
ries, teacher-pupil ratios, learning resources, textbooks and course
offerings among the schools.'s This concept emphasizes equal access
to equally funded education, and reflects the belief that factors such
as class size and course offerings affect a child's opportunity and
ability to learn."
For those who believe that the amount of money expended
on a child's education can affect educational achievement, one
focus of the movement to achieve equal educational opportunity
has been to seek court-ordered equalization of funding so that
all public school districts within a state receive about the same
amount of money per pupil per year (per pupil expenditures).°
This strategy is, in essence, a constitutional challenge to the
state's decision to fund public schools partially through local
property tax revenue raised by each school district, though
the state recognizes that the amount of money school districts
can raise varies with the value of the property within their
district.° School reform plaintiffs contend that the use of this fi-
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 84. In response to the concern about the disproportionately low academic
achievement of students from impoverished and minority backgrounds, federal and state
governments developed compensatory education programs. Id. These programs were de-
signed to eliminate the effects on school children of racial isolation and economic and cultural
deprivation. Id.
' 2
 Id. at 82.
16 Id.
14 Id.
IS See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 590, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
604 (1971).
16 See School Finance Reform, supra note I, at 87. The financing plans that are being
constitutionally challenged in these school finance reform cases are the result of a series of
decisions made by the state. Under the United States Constitution, states are not required to
provide free public education, but all fifty states have chosen to do so through statutory or
constitutional provisions. RACIAL ISOLATION, ROM note 2, at 260. In organizing their statewide
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nancing system causes significant, and unconstitutional, differences
systems of public schools, the states have traditionally allowed each city or town to establish
its own school district, and to operate it as a relatively autonomous unit. School Finance Reform,
supra note I, at 87. Instead of Funding these locally-organized school districts totally through
state funds, states have chosen to fund these school districts through a combination funding
plan consisting of state aid derived from statewide taxes, and of tax revenue derived by
school districts from local property taxes. Barro, Alternative Post-Serrano Systems and Their
Expenditure Implications (1974), [hereinafter Implications] in SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION,
supra note I, at 35. The state funding generally provides only ten to fifty percent of the
neccesary operating budget of a school district. See id.
The remainder of the funds a school district needs to provide for its state-mandated
compulsory education is generally derived from local property taxes. See H. Levin, Effects of
Expenditure Increases on Educational Resource Allocation and Effectiveness (1974) [hereinafter
Effects of Expenditures], in SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 1, at 177. Property
taxes are the mainstay of most school district? local revenue, though some states permit their
school districts to levy nonproperty taxes as well. R. Hartman & R. Reischauer, The Effect of
Reform in School Finance on the Level and Distribution of Tax Burden (1974), in SCHOOL FINANCE
IN TRANSITION, supra note 1, at 108, 109. Even in these states, however, property taxes are
still the major source for local funds. Id. at 109, 113, 119.
In contrast to the relatively equal Funding that school districts receive from the state,
the amount of money that school districts receive from local property taxes varies consider-
ably. See supra note 1, at 177. This difference in local tax revenues typically occurs because
there is a significant variation among school districts in terms of the per capita value of the
property located within the districts' boundaries. See Final Report to the California Senate Select
Committee on School District Finance 9 (1972) [hereinafter Final Report] as quoted in School
Finance Reform, supra note I, at 87. Because property taxes are calculated on the basis of the
value of a piece of property, school districts with high property values ("property-rich school
districts") can collect significantly more money to fund their schools. Id.
Property-rich school districts can often collect these larger sums of money at a lower tax
rate than can school districts with low property values ("property-poor school districts"). Id.
If a school district levies a tax of $2.00 on each $1,000 of property valuation, for example,
a piece of property worth $10,000 will yield $20.00 in property tax revenues. See generally
Massachusetts, Department of Education, Bureau of Data Collection and Processing, "School
District Comparisons of Boston, Braintree, Lawrence" (Fiscal Year 1988-89). If a piece of
property is worth $2,000, the same tax rate will yield only $4.00. See id. Thus, school districts
that have a high average per capita property valuation have a greater ability to raise funds
for local schools than do school districts where the average per capita valuation of property
is much lower. See id.
The differential ability of school districts to raise local funds affects the amount of money
a school district is able to spend per year per pupil on education. See id. The differences in
the amount of money spent per pupil among school districts in turn has a measurable impact
on class size, faculty, resources and curriculum. See RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at 30.
The effect of this differential funding on the quality of education led commentators to
observe that when states choose to use a combination system of state aid and local property
taxes to fund public schools, and do not equalize the inequities that the use of property taxes
cause, the quality of a child's education becomes a function of the wealth of his or her
parents, neighbors and school district. See School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 85.
The Final Report points out how states have created the school finance systems charac-
terized by the inequities condemned in school finance cases:
(I) The state permits local school districts to exist, (2) the state gives each district
the power to raise money through a local property tax on property physically
located within the district's border, (3) the state permits each district to keep
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in the amount of money spent per child on education between
property-rich and property-poor school districts."
In seeking court-ordered school finance reform, the plaintiffs'
key premise in school finance cases is that disparity in school fi-
nancing denies children in property-poor school districts educa-
tional opportunities substantially equal to those enjoyed by other
childreni 8 Plaintiffs have thus argued that a funding system that
produces significant financial disparities in per pupil expenditures
among a state's school districts should be declared unconstitutional
because it violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment by discriminating against children from poor areas of
the state. h 9 Plaintiffs have also pursued the equal protection argu-
ment at the state level, alleging that this type of funding disparity
violates their respective state equal protection clauses as well."
A third basis on which plaintiffs have argued that this type of
unequal funding system is unconstitutional relies on the education
provision in the state's constitution that authorizes the legislature
to establish a state public school system. 21 The actual wording of
these establishment provisions varies from state to state. 22 Generally,
however, these establishment provisions specify that the state main-
tain a school system with certain characteristics such as efficiency,
thoroughness or uniformity." Plaintiffs in school finance cases have
thus charged that a school finance system that results in significant
funding disparities among school districts is not "efficient," "uni-
form" or "thorough," and is thus unconstitutional. 24
the money it raises, knowing that from district to district the ability to raise
money for schools varies widely because of the dramatically uneven distribution
of property wealth about the state, and (4) the state faits to equalize these wealth
differences through "state aid" . .
Final Report as quoted in School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 87.





2' See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 501-19, 303 A.2d 273, 287-97 (1973).
Robinson was the first case in which plaintiffs made this argument successfully.
' See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (public
school system to be efficient); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396
(Tex. 1989) (public school system to be efficient); NEV. CONST. art. 11, 2 (school system to
be uniform).
23
 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 396.
44 See, e.g., Robinson, 62 N.J. at 501-19, 303 A.2d at 287-97.
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Since 1968, when the first school finance reform case was de-
cided, plaintiffs from twenty-eight states have argued that their
respective state plans for financing public schools were unconstitu-
tional based on equal protection or state education provision
grounds. 2' In Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New
These states, and their respective cases, include:
Illinois (1968): McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. III. 1968), aff'd sub
nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
Virginia (1969): Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd,
397 U.S. 44 (1970).
California (1971): Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 1 3.2c1 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, appeal after remand, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
Minnesota (1971): Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
Wyoming (1971): Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234
(Wyo. 1971).
Georgia (1972): Battle v. Cherry, 339 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
Kansas (1972): Caldwell v. Kansas, Civil No. 50616 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 30,
1972).
Maryland (1972): Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972).
Texas (1973): San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
New Jersey (1973): Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), on
reh'g Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A,2d 713 (1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
Arizona (1973): Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
Michigan (1973): Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972),
vacated, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
Montana (1974): State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont. 141, 520 P.2d 776,
cert. denied sub nom. Woodahl v. Straub, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
Washington (1974): Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash, 2d
685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
Idaho (1975): Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975).
Illinois (1976): Illinois ex rel. v. Jones v. Adams, 40 III. App. 3d 189, 350 N.E.2d
767 (1976).
Oregon (1976): Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
Wisconsin (1976): Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d . 550, 247 N.W.2d 147 (1976).
Connecticut (1977): Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
Washington (1978): Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 476, 585 P.2d
71 (1978).
Pennsylvania (1979): Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979).
	 .
W. Virginia (1979): Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
Ohio (1979): Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813,
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980),
Wyoming (1980): Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d
310, cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs County School Dist. No. 1 v. Washakie
County School Dist. No. 1, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
Georgia (1981): McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981).
Colorado (1982): Lujan v. Board of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
New York (1982): Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359,
453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
15
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Jersey, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, courts have
considered issues related to the constitutionality of state school
funding plans at least twice. 26 Until 1989, however, the school fi-
nance reform movement was only marginally successful, and inter-
est in court-ordered school finance reform appeared to be decreas-
ing. 27
Then, in 1989, within months of each other, courts in Kentucky,
Montana and Texas declared their respective state school financing
plans unconstitutional on the grounds that significant disparities in
school district funding violated their state education provisions.28
Montana also declared its state system of financing schools uncon-
stitutional because the state had forced school districts to rely on
permissive tax levies that voters could reject. 29
Maryland (1983): Hornbeck v. Board of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758
(1983).
Arkansas (1983): Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d
90 (1983).
Michigan (1984): East Jackson Pub. Schools v. State, 133 Mich. App. 132, 348
N.W.2d 303 (1984).
Oklahoma (1987): Fair School Fin. Council of Oklahoma v. State, 746 P.2d 1135
(Okla. 1987).
S. Carolina (1988): Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470
(1988).
Montana (1989): Helena Elementary School Dist. No. I v. State, 236 Mont. 44,
769 P.2d 684 (1989).
Wisconsin (1989): Kukor v. Grove, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).
Kentucky (1989); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
Texas (1989): Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.
1990):
New Jersey (1990): Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
26 See supra note 25.
22 Prior to 1989, public school financing systems had been declared unconstitutional in
only ten states: Dupree, 279 Ark. at 345, 651 S.W.2d at 93; Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 618-19, 487
P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626; Horton, 172 Conn. at 648-49, 376 A.2d at 374; Caldwell,
Civil No. 50616 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 1972); Rose, 790 S.W. 2d at 215; Van Dusartz, 334 F.
Supp. at 877 ; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 47, 769 P.2d at 691; Robinson,
62 N.J. at 480, 303 A.2d at 276; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 396; Washakie
County School Dist. No. 1, 606 P.2d at 322, cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs County School
Dist. No. 1 v. Washakie County School Dig. No. 1, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). Only six of these
decisions, however, came after the 1973 Rodriguez decision. The last decision that held a state
financing system unconstitutional occurred in 1983. See Dupree, 279 Ark. at 345, 651 S.W.2d
at 93. There were no school reform cases decided between 1984 ancf1987, and just one case
was decided in 1987 and 1988. See supra note 25.
28 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 47, 796
P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 77 S.W.2d at 396.
49
 Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 55, 796 P.2d at 690.
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In addition to these three funding disparity cases, 1989 also
saw the revival of an issue first raised in the late 1960s: whether
equal educational opportunity requires not just equal access to
equally funded programs, but equal access to programs that are
equally effective." The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this con-
cept,3 ' but the New Jersey Supreme Court held in a 1990 case that
the state must expend more funds on the education of disadvan-
taged children from court-identified poor urban school districts
because of their special needs. 32 Moreover, in light of the municipal
overburden faced by the cities, the New jersey Supreme Court ruled
that the state could no longer place the financial responsibility for
educating disadvantaged children on these urban school districts,
but must instead guarantee adequate funds to meet the educational
needs of these children.33
With the addition of the 1989-1990 court decisions, the school
finance reform movement appears to have entered a new phase.
Commentators have observed a revived interest in the school fi-
nance reform movement as a means of equalizing educational op-
portunity through equalizing access to equally funded programs,"
In addition, the 1989-1990 decisions have also focused attention
on the constitutionality of state school funding systems that require
local voter approval of school taxes, or depend on the availability
of local resources, to fund a basic education." Moreover, the New
Jersey decision has added a new branch to the school finance move-
ment that focuses not on equal funding, but on the need to provide
more funding for disadvantaged children in order to equalize the
effectiveness of a public school education. 36
Massachusetts is one of twenty-two states in which courts have
yet to rule on the constitutionality of the state's plan for financing
schools." Factually, however, the current school financing system in
31) See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990); Kukor v. Grover,
148 Wis. 2d 469, 474, 436 N.W.2d 568, 570 (1989). The first case in which plaintiffs used
educational needs as the definition of equal educational opportunity was McInnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111. 1968), aff'd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
31 Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 474, 436 N.W.2d at 570.
52 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 374, 575 A.2d at 403.
33 Id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408.
54 See, e.g., Felsenthal, New Jersey's Public School Financing Is Struck Down by State's Highest
Court, Wall St. J,, June 6, 1990, at A18, col. 1-2.
35 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood
lndep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989).
w See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 287, 575 A.2d at 359.
" See supra note 25.
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Massachusetts bears a close resemblance to the Kentucky, Montana
and Texas systems that have recently been declared unconstitu-
tional. The Massachusetts system of financing schools is character-
ized by unequal funding, local voter control over funds needed to
support the schools and lower levels of funding in many school
districts that have large populations of disadvantaged children. 38
The history of the school finance reform movement, however, in-
dicates that the ultimate success of a court case challenging the
Massachusetts system of financing schools will depend not only on
the facts related to unequal funding, but also on the legal arguments
that potential plaintiffs choose to make. This note, then, assesses
both the factual and legal bases for mounting a successful challenge
to the current inequitable system of financing schools in Massachu-
setts.
In making this assessment, this note first reviews, in Section I,
the history of the school finance reform movement and the evolu-
tion of the concept of equal educational opportunity under the
fourteenth amendment. 39 Sections 11,40 1114 ' and IV42 examine the
three waves of school finance reform cases that federal and state
courts have considered between 1968 and 1990. Section V focuses
on the statistical and constitutional bases for challenging the legality
of the current system of financing public education in Massachu-
setts.'" Finally, Section VI assesses the likelihood that a successful
challenge to the current inequitable system of funding Massachu-
setts public schools can be mounted based either on the federal or
state equal protection clauses or on the Massachusetts constitutional
provision on education. 44 The note concludes that a successful con-
stitutional challenge to the current system of funding schools in
Massachusetts can likely be mounted based either on the state's
education provision or on the state's equal protection clause.45
se See Boston Globe, Feb. 9,1991, at 1, col. 1; Boston Globe, Nov. 22,1990, at A58, col.
6.
'9 See infra notes 46-144 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 145-215 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 216-90 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 291-360 and accompanying text. The term "third wave" has also been
used in this context by William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky,
and Texas Decisions on Public School Finance Reform Litigation, J. L. & Eouc. 219-50 (March
1990).
" See infra notes 361-453 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 454-69 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 470-71 and accompanying text.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF "EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY" UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Plessy v. Ferguson and Early Fourteenth Amendment Decisions of
the United States Supreme Court
In the area of education, the legal definition of equal educa-
tional opportunity has been defined and has evolved primarily
through federal cases interpreting the fourteenth amendment. 4°
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that it is unlawful for a state to make or enforce any law that
will deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law. 47 The primary purpose of the amendment, which Congress
passed after the Civil War, was to ensure that states could not make
laws that would abridge the rights of, or discriminate against, the
newly-freed slaves." It was unclear, however, what constituted "dis-
crimination," and what types of laws the equal protection clause
might affect. These were issues which the Supreme Court would
be called upon to interpret on numerous occasions. 49
The first decision related to the fourteenth amendment that
had a direct impact on the legal definition of equal educational
opportunity was Plessy v. Ferguson, which the Supreme Court
handed down in 1896. 5° In Plessy, the Supreme Court examined
the constitutionality of a Louisiana law requiring that all railway
companies operating in Louisiana provide equal but separate
coaches for "white and colored races."5 ' The Court held that this
law requiring separate accommodations on the basis of race was not
unconstitutional in part because it believed the fourteenth amend-
ment applied to the political, but not the social, arena. 52 Separate
but equal accommodations, the Supreme Court therefore con-
cluded, did not deprive the "colored man" of his property without
the due process of law, nor deny him the equal protection of the
law within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment."
48 School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 82.
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
4° See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586, 588
(11th ed. 1985).
42 See id.
" School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 83.
51 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896). The fourteenth amendment was ratified
in 1868.
52 Id. at 549.
55 Id. at 542.
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The Plessy decision was applied not only to public accommo-
dations, but to public schools as well." Until Plessy was overturned
in 1954, the "separate but equal" doctrine defined equality of ed-
ucational opportunity in public education. 55 Thus, during this sixty-
year period, the movement to achieve equality of educational op-
portunity for all children focused on the elimination of easily iden-
tifiable inequalities that existed between black and white schools. 56
Court suits were primarily designed to force school districts to
equalize black schools in terms of tangible factors such as school
facilities, teacher-pupil ratios and course offerings. 57
In addition to court suits during this period that were designed
to enforce the "separate but equal" doctrine, efforts to overturn the
Plessy decision began." Led by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), the legal battle to
overturn Plessy and force the desegregation of public schools began
in the late 1930s, and spanned two decades. 59 The initial court cases
in conjunction with this effort focused on the desegregation of
public graduate and professional schools because the NAACP felt
that states could not provide separate but equal schools for blacks
at this leve1. 60
 In addition, Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall,
who in the 1950s spearheaded the NAACP's cases, recalled that the
higher education strategy was also chosen because the NAACP felt
" See School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 83. Plessy was overturned in 1954 by Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
55 Id.
" See, e.g., Blue v. Durham Pub. School Dist., 95 F. Supp. 441, 445 (M.D.N.C. 1951).
In Blue, the United States District Court in North Carolina ruled that the Durham Public
School System deprived black children of the equal protection of the law by failing to furnish
them with facilities substantially equal to those furnished white children. Id. The district
court noted advantages for white children in the areas of supervision, curriculum, equipment
and teacher load. Id. at 444-45. Average daily attendance figures indicated about 55% white
and 45% black children. Id. at 444. White children, however, had thirteen school buildings
built at a cost nearly twice that of the eight buildings allotted to black children. Id. White
children also had three junior high schools, whereas black children had none, and the
buildings allotted to the black children often had fewer facilities than those found in the
white schools. Id. Based on these findings, and following the separate but equal guideline ,
outlined in Plessy, the district court held that the school district violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
57 See id.
58
 See generally A. Kelley, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED
THE CONSTITUTION 243, 247-49, 253 (1964), as quoted in P. BREST AND S. LEVINSON, PRO-
CESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 404-06 (2d ed. 1983).
59 Id.
6° See id.
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southerners would be less emotional about the integration of col-
leges and universities.'''
The NAACP's strategy to begin its desegregation campaign
with professional and graduate schools proved to be successful, and
the first decision requiring the admission of a black student to a
previously all-white state-supported law school came in 1938. 62 In
a decision that it would reaffirm in principle ten years later," the
Supreme Court in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada ruled that Mis-
souri had not provided black students with equal protection of the
law by paying their tuition to out-of-state law schools and denying
black students admission to state-supported law schools in Mis-
souri." Emphasizing equality in terms of tangible factors related to
schooling, the Court held that black students were entitled to sub-
stantially equal facilities within the state and, in the absence of these
facilities, that they must be admitted to white schools. 65 -
A decade later, the NAACP presented the Supreme Court with
two higher education cases that focused attention not only on the
equalization of tangible factors related to schooling, but on the
necessity to equalize intangible factors as wel1.66 Thus in Sweatt v.
Painter, decided in 1950, the Supreme Court considered whether a
black law school which had been quickly established by the state of
Texas provided an equal education. 67 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that it did not, finding that the Texas State University for
Negroes was not only inferior to the University of Texas Law School
in terms of tangible factors such as library holdings, but also in
terms of intangible qualities that "made for greatness" in a law
8 ) Id. As Marshall stated:
Those racial supremacy boys somehow think that little kids of six or seven
are going to get funny ideas about sex and marriage just from going to school
together, but for some equally funny reason youngsters in law school aren't
supposed to feel that way. We didn't get it, but we decided if that was what the
South believed, then the best thing for the movement was to go along.
Id.
62 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v, Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
62 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle in the Gaines decision in Sipuel v.
University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631,632-33 (1948). In Sipuel, the Court held that a black
student denied admission solely because of her race had to he admitted to that state-supported
institution. Id. at 632-33.
" 305 U.S. 337,349-50 (1938).
65 Id.
56 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950).
6 ' 339 U.S. 629,633-35 (1950).
1116	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 32:1105
school, such as faculty reputation, community standing, traditions
and prestige.68
 The Supreme Court held in Sweatt that the state of
Texas could require blacks to attend a segregated law school only
if that school could offer black students a legal education equivalent
to that offered students of other races in terms of tangible and
intangible factors. 69
The Supreme Court further emphasized the importance of
intangible factors in judging equality of educational opportunity in
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, a decision
handed down in 1950 on the same day as Sweatt." In McLaurin, the
Supreme Court was faced with the necessity of determining if seg-
regating an individual within a classroom, in and of itself, affected
the equality of the person's education." The Supreme Court an-
swered in the affirmative, ruling in McLaurin that a black student
admitted to a state university to pursue a program not offered at
the state's black graduate school could not be required to sit in
separate sections of the classroom, library and cafeteria. 72 Such
restrictions were unconstitutional, the Court observed, because they
impaired the .black student's ability to learn his chosen profession
by preventing him from engaging in discussions with his peers and
professors." With McLaurin, the attention of the Supreme Court
was thus firmly fixed on the intangible psychological effects of
segregation on blacks. 74
 After McLaurin, the stage was set for the
NAACP to present the Supreme Court with a case that would
require the court to determine if segregated schools, by their very
nature, deprived black children of the equal protection of the law
even though their facilities might be equal."
B. Equal Educational Opportunity Through Integration: The Promise of
Brown v. Board of Education
In 1952, the NAACP was able to present the Supreme Court
with not one but four public school cases addressing the doctrine
" Id. at 634-35.
69 Id.
70 339 U.S. 637, 638 (1950).
" Id. at 640-42.
72 Id. at 641-42.
73 Id. at 642.
73
 See generally A. Kelley, The School Desegregation Case in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED
THE CONSTITUTION 243, 247-49, 253 (1964), as quoted in P. BREST AND S. LEVINSON, PRO.
CF-SSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 404-06 (2d ed. 1983).
75 See id. In Sweatt, plaintiffs had argued for a re-examination of Plessy v. Ferguson, but
the Supreme Court chose to decide the case on narrower grounds. 339 U.S. at 635-36.
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of "separate but equal."76 Three of these cases had resulted in lower
court rulings that the separate public school facilities provided to
black children were "equal," and thus constitutional. 77 Consolidated
under the federal district court case from Kansas, Brown v. Board of
Education, each of the four cases varied in terms of facts, but all
involved black children seeking admission to schools attended solely
by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation
according to race. 78 The Supreme Court heard arguments on Brown
in the 1952 term, and in 1954 held that segregated schools were
inherently unequal."
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown was based in part on
studies that demonstrated that segregated schools had a negative
psychological effect on black children." The Supreme Court noted
that segregation had a psychologically detrimental effect on black
students because the policy of separating races was usually inter-
preted as denoting the inferiority of the black race. 8 ' This sense of
inferiority that blacks felt because of segregation affected the mo-
tivation of black children to learn, and deprived them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school sys-
tem.82 Given this negative effect of segregation on the black child,
the Supreme Court in Brown held that in the field of public edu-
cation, the doctrine of "separate but equal" had no place."
In reaching its decision in Brown, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that it could only judge if segregated public schools deprived
black students of the equal protection of the law by considering
public education "in light of its full development and its present
place in American life."84 In what courts now consider to be the
classic statement on the role of education in our society, the Su-
preme Court in Brown wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments . . . . It is required in the
76 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,486 (1954),
77 Id, In the fourth case, the Delaware Supreme Court adhered to the separate but equal
doctrine but ordered the plaintiffs admitted to the superior white schools. Id.
78 Id.
" Id. at 487-88. The 1954 term reargument focused on the intent of the framers of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 489.
ao Id. at 494.
61 Id. (quoting the Kansas federal district court's opinion with approval).
S2 Id.
B' Id. at 495.
84 Id.
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performance of our most basic public responsibilities ... .
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education."
Such an opportunity, the Supreme Court concluded, "where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." 86
 Though it did not define the
concept of "equal terms," in holding that segregated schools were
inherently unequal and unconstitutional, the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Brown seemed to many national leaders to offer great
promise to those who wished to make equal educational opportunity
a reality for all children. 87
C. Still Segregated, Still Unequal: Public Schooling After Brown
Despite the promise of Brown, by the mid-1960s government
studies began to indicate that Brown had had little impact either on
providing equal educational opportunity for all children, or on
eliminating segregated schooling. 88 This continued segregation of
American schools concerned national leaders in the mid-1960s, both
because of the negative effects of segregation on black children, 89
and because it was difficult to see how such a segregated school
system could lead to an integrated society." In addition, national
leaders were also -concerned about continued segregation because
the segregated schools attended by inner-city minority youth were
inferior to those attended by white suburban children. 9 ' The United
States Commission on Civil Rights ("Civil Rights Commission")
85 Id, at 493.
88 Id.
87 See generally RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at iv.
" See id. at 2-3. The United States Office of Education reported in 1966 that most
children in the United States went to school with children of backgrounds similar to their
own. Id. (quoting COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL. OPPORTUNITY 3 (1966)). This situation
existed not because the state had ordered deliberate segregation of the schools, but because
the state mandated that children attend school in their own school district. Id. at 41. School
districts, in turn, generally required children to attend schools in their own neighborhoods,
which were largely segregated. Id. at 12-13,41-42.
" Id, at 202-04.
9° Id. at 214.
9 ' E.g., id. at 30-31,213.
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placed much of the responsibility for the inferior quality of these
urban schools on the state because of the type of school districting
plans and funding patterns that states had allowed to develop in
metropolitan areas, 92
As the Civil Rights Commission detailed in Racial Isolation in
the Schools, the population in the United States had been gradually
shifting to urban areas." In making the move to the city, blacks had
settled primarily in the inner or central city, and as they did so, the
white population in urban areas had shifted from the city to the
suburbs." States had allowed suburbs to set up their own school
districts financed and operated separately from city schools.° The
Civil Rights Commission reported that a single metropolitan area
might be served by forty or more school districts; in the Boston
metropolitan area alone the Commission reported that there were
seventy-five separate school districts.96 Each of these school districts
in turn was funded separately, through a combination of state aid
and local property taxes.`'? Had cities and suburbs been equally able
to raise funds to support their schools, this type of multi-district
plan within a metropolitan area would have had little impact on the
quality of education provided in city and suburban schools. 98
City and suburban school districts, however, were not equal in
terms of their ability to raise local funds, their municipal burdens
and the state funds they received. 99 Part of the problem that city
school districts faced, according to the Civil Rights Commission, was
the competition for funds within the city between the schools and
other local services.l° The central cities in metropolitan areas spent
three times as much on welfare and twice as much on public safety
as did the suburbs because they had to provide for more poor
people, and continue to provide city services for non-resident sub-
urbanites working in the city.'" The city school districts could thus
not claim as high a percentage of the city budget as suburban school
districts could claim from their suburbs)° 2
92 Id.
92 Id, at 17-18.
94 Id. at 17-19,25.
" 5 Id, at 17.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 25-28.
99 RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at 25.
99 Id.
'Do Id. at 25-26.
nu Id. at 26.
142 See id. at 25-27.
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City schools also faced the problem of declining city budgets)°3
The suburbanization of affluent families and businesses had caused
the city tax base to shrink. 1 D4 Cities were generally able to raise less
money through taxes on local property than suburbs because the
property within the city typically was worth less per capita than that
in the suburbs)°5 Moreover, state funds for education did not close
the gap caused by property taxes because states were actually fund-
ing suburban districts at a higher level than city districts. 106 In many
metropolitan areas, including Boston, the states contributed more
money per child in 1966 to suburban school districts than to the
city school districts)"
The Civil Rights Commission concluded that because of mu-
nicipal overburden in cities, unequal state aid, and the use of local
property taxes to fund schools, property-rich suburbs could buy
significantly better schools than could city school districts) 08 The
Commission observed that these facts led to a cyclical problem, as
the better schools that suburbs could afford encouraged more
whites to flee the city. White flight further decreased the city's tax
base, resulting in less funds available for city schools. Cities then
had to increase their tax rate to raise even the same amount of
money, and the increased tax rate encouraged more white flight
and renewed the cycle. The end result of this whole process was
that thousands of poor and mostly minority children were isolated
in what one member of the Civil Rights Commission described as
"inadequately staffed and ill-equipped [urban] slum schools."° 9 The
urban minority poor, Commissioner Freeman observed, seldom had
access to the quality of education provided the mostly white children
who attended suburban schools on the other side of what he called
"The Great Divide.' ,110
The Civil Rights Commission made a number of recommen-
dations in its 1966 report designed to improve the quality of urban
city schools and decrease segregation in public education)" In
general it favored massive congressional action rather than court
action, because Congress had the ability to appropriate funds to
i 0' Id. at 25.
11' Id, at 26.
")5 Id.
I" Id. at 27-28.
1°7 Id. at 28-29.
'" Id. at 31.
109 Id. at 213 (supplementary statement by Commissioner Freeman).
110 Id.
"' See ed. at 115-83.
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remedy the myriad of problems that had led to the inferior quality
of urban inner-city schools." 2 In a short but detailed section in the
legal appendix of the Commission's report, however, the Commis-
sion also discussed the possibility that the substantial fiscal and
tangible inequalities that existed between the city and suburban
school districts could contravene the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause." 3 The Commission observed that with respect to
public education the state might be under no obligation to provide
it, but that once having made a decision to provide it, the state
might be under an obligation under the fourteenth amendment to
see that rich and poor children received that education on substan-
tially equal terms." 4
By the mid-1960s, then, considerable evidence revealed that
the public schools in the United States were neither integrated nor
equal."3 It was also clear that the Brown decision by itself could
neither totally eliminate segregated schooling in the United States
nor ensure equal educational opportunity for all. "s The Brown
decision applied only to intentionally segregated schools, and was
ineffective in combating segregated schooling caused by segregated
housing patterns and state policies requiring children to attend
school in their own neighborhoods." 7 Moreover, the Court never
intended the Brown decision to combat inequities in school financ-
ing." 3 By the mid-1960s most black children were attending neither
the integrated schools that Brown seemed to promise in 1954, nor
the "separate but equal" schools that Plessy mandated in 1896." 9
D. The Supreme Court Broadens the Scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Harper v. Board of Education Sets the Stage for the
Initial Challenge to State School Funding Plans
Although the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by Brown
was limited to the prohibition of intentional racial discrimination,
"2 Id. at 187-88.
1 ' 1 Id. at 261, n.282; see also Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A
Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 311, 338-45
(1969), in which the authors argue that the federal Constitution requires fiscal neutrality.
Under this concept, states might vary in terms of money spent on education. Such variation,
however, would not occur within a single state.
114 RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at 260-61.
" 3 See generally id. at 2-3.
116 See id. supra note 2, at iv.
111
"8 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
119 See generally RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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after Brown the Supreme Court made a series of decisions that
broadened the applicability of the fourteenth amendment and of-
fered a new avenue for the legal pursuit of equal educational op-
portunity.' 20
 Historically, as exemplified in Plessy and Brown, the
Supreme Court had interpreted the fourteenth amendment to ap-
ply only to laws that had an unequal impact on an identifiable racial
group, or on an individual who was a member of the group. 12 ' If a
law classified people on a basis other than the "suspect" category of
race or national origin, and was applied differently depending on
one's classification, the Court was still likely to uphold the law as
long as the classification used was reasonably or rationally related
to the legislature's purpose inipassing the law.' 22
The requirement that a law be rationally related to a state goal
was generally, as commentator Gerald Gunther noted, easily satis-
fied.'" Except where race was involved, the Court did not require
that the classification used in the law exactly "fit" the purpose of
the law.' 24
 The Court allowed legislators considerable flexibility in
framing laws that classified people according to the benefits con-
ferred or the burdens imposed on the people, unless racial discrim-
ination was involved.'"
Beginning with the Warren Court, however, Gunther noted
that the Supreme Court broadened the situations in which a state
law might be subject to the "strict scrutiny" of the Court.' 26
 Instead
of being limited to laws involving the "suspect category" of race,
under the Warren Court, laws that affected "fundamental rights"
were also subject to the Court's "strict scrutiny." 127
 This strict scru-
tiny standard meant that a law affecting the exercise of a funda-
mental right would only be upheld if the state could show a com-
pelling interest for the law which could not be met in any other
way. 128
The effect of requiring that a law meet the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of the Court was considerable.' 29 Under this standard, instead
122 See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586, 588
(1 Ith ed. 1985).
' 2 ' Id.
122
 Id. at 587.
122 Id.




128 Id. at 670.
129 Id,
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of the Court assuming that a state law was constitutional, and re-
quiring only that it bear a rational relationship to a state interest,
the Court required the state to assume the burden of proof and
demonstrate that it had a compelling reason to classify people in a
way that might interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental
right." 130 As Gunther noted, determining that a law required the
strict scrutiny of the Court meant that the scrutiny was "strict in
theory, and fatal in fact." 3 '
In including "fundamental rights" under the umbrella of the
strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court initially interpreted
fundamental rights to include only those rights specifically guar-
anteed in the federal constitution, such as the right of interstate
migration.' 32 In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, however, the
Supreme Court in 1966 broadened its definition of a fundamental
right, and held that a fundamental right could be implied rather
than explicitly stated in the federal Constitution.'" The Harper case
involved a 'constitutional challenge to a state law that required
citizens to pay an annual fee, or poll tax, of $1.50 to vote.'" The
Supreme Court held that this poll tax law was unconstitutional
because it could potentially interfere with a person's fundamental
right to exercise his or her power to vote.'"
The Harper Court reasoned that the right to vote was a fun-
damental right because it was "preservative of all other rights" and
thus could be considered to be implicitly guaranteed in the Consti-
tution.'" In addition, the Supreme Court also seemed to imply that
a state could not discriminate on the basis of wealth.'" Thus, when
a law like the poll tax was used to condition the receipt of a fun-
damental right, it appeared to some observers that the law would
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
not just because it interfered with a fundamental right, but also
because it discriminated on the basis of wealth.'" To some, the
Harper decision seemed to indicate that the Supreme Court would
consider wealth, like race, to be a "suspect" category, requiring a
130 Id.
/31 Id.
"2 Id. at 587-88.
'" See 383 U.S. 663, 665, 667 (1966).
"4 Id. at 665.
133 Id. at 667.
136 Id.
137 Id.
133 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596-97, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249-50, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 609-10 (1971).
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law that assigned benefits based on wealth to meet the "strict scru-
tiny" standard to be upheld.' 39
After Harper, then, there appeared to be two ways in which a
state law could be subject to the strict scrutiny of the Court."° A
law could be subject to strict scrutiny because it interfered with a
right that was "fundamental," either because the right was explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed in the federal Constitution."' A state law
could also be subject to strict scrutiny if it classified people on the
basis of a suspect category, which might include classifications made
on the basis of wealth. i 42 Since the activation of the strict scrutiny
of the Court generally proved to be fatal to the law, successfully
arguing that a law affected a fundamental right, or classified people
on the basis of a suspect category, would almost surely lead to a
declaration that the law was unconstitutional. 193 Because state school
finance laws involved a "right" that was not explicitly stated in the
federal Constitution, but was arguably being affected by the
"wealth" of a child's school district, Harper was an important decision
for those interested in school finance reform.'"
II. THE INITIAL LEGAL ARGUMENT IN SCHOOL FINANCE CASES:
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT FROM SERRANO TO RODRIGUEZ
Even before the Supreme Court had handed down the Harper
decision, the Civil Rights Commission had predicted the possibility
of future court action challenging state financing plans under the
fourteenth amendment.'" And just two years after the Commis-
sion's 1966 report on Racial Isolation in the Schools, 146 the first of the
school finance reform cases challenging the constitutionality of a
state's school finance system under the fourteenth amendment was
decided."' This initial court case in the school finance reform move-
''9 See id.
140 See generally Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-68 (1966).
141 See id.
"5 See id.
145 G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 588 (11th ed. 1988).
'" See id. The Serrano court, for example, made a specific reference to the decision in
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) with respect to the issue of wealth
as a suspect category. Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
145 See RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 2, at 187-88.
116 Id.
147 See, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd sub nom. McInnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). Prior to McInnis, two court cases had been filed in Georgia
that charged that the Georgia method of financing schools violated the equal protection
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ment, however, was based not on the differences in funding among
a state's school districts, which the Commission had highlighted, but
on the state's failure to apportion funds based on the educational
needs of children.'"
According to historians, this educational needs argument was
spurred by articles published in the late 1960s, which argued that
because of their socioeconomic background, disadvantaged children
were unable to compete effectively against their more advantaged
counterparts. 149 The authors of these articles contended that dis-
advantaged children actually needed more school funds allotted to
their education so that they could compete on an equal basis.'"
Instead, these disadvantaged children actually received less funds
for their education than their wealthier peers. 15 ' In the initial con-
stitutional challenges to inequities in school funding using this ed-
ucational needs argument, however, the cases were ruled nonjusti-
ciable. 152
A. Suspect Categories and Fundamental Interests: Serrano v. Priest
and the First Wave of the School Finance Reform Movement
The educational needs argument of the 1960s proved to be
short-lived, and in the 1971 case of Serrano v. Priest the California
Supreme Court abandoned this approach.'" Instead, the California
Supreme Court based its 1971 decision declaring California's system
of financing public education unconstitutional on a more familiar
standard—the difference in per pupil educational expenditures that
existed among the state's school districts.'" The Serrano court be-
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Ingram v. Payton and Rice v. Cook, however, the issue
was the different amount of local funds that certain types of school districts were expected
to raise. Ingram, 222 Ga. 503, 509, 150 S.E.2d 825, 829 (1966); Rice, 222 Ga. 499, 501, 150
S.E.2d 822, 823 (1966). Other commentators have not considered these early Georgia cases
to be a part of the school finance reform movement. See, e.g., School Finance Reform, supra
note 1, at 83.
"a See Mclnnis, 293 F. Supp. at 331.
"9 School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 84,
160 Id.
191 Id.
152 Mclnnis, 293 F. Supp. at 331; Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va.
1969).
19' 5 Cal. 3d 584, 590 n.1, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 n.1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 n.1 (1971).
In Serrano, the plaintiffs apparently made a brief reference to the educational needs argument
in their initial suit. Id. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 605. The initial suit was
dismissed by the district court. Id.
1 " Id. at 594 n.9, 487 P.2d at 1247 n.9, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 607 n.9. The plaintiff's alleged
violation of certain state constitutional provisions that the California Supreme Court had
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came the first court in the nation to hold that this difference in per
pupil expenditures had a significant impact on the quality of edu-
cation offered in poorer school districts, and that poor children
were thus denied the equal protection of the law under the four-
teenth amendment.' 55
In reaching this decision, the California Supreme Court in
Serrano first considered the plaintiffs' contention that education was
a fundamental right that the federal Constitution implicitly guar-
anteed. 156 The California Supreme Court began its analysis of this
issue by examining the "indispensible" role that education plays in
the modern industrial state,' 57 and also noted that the United States
Supreme Court had recognized the fundamental importance of
education in Brown. The Serrano court observed that although Brown
was not controlling, it provided persuasive evidence of the impor-
tance of education in our society.'" Moreover, in comparing edu-
cation with other rights that the Supreme Court had already held
to be fundamental, the Serrano court maintained that education had
a far greater social significance than, for example, the right to a
court-appointed attorney.' 59 In addition, the California Supreme
Court also saw a strong analogy between education and the right
to vote, which the Supreme Court had also categorized as a "fun-
damental right."60 The Serrano court observed that education, like
voting, preserved other basic rights, and, at the very least, made
voting more effective.'m
Given all of these factors, the Serrano court concluded that the
"distinctive and priceless function of education ... warranted, and
indeed compelled, its treatment as a fundamental interest.',I62 In
addition, based on its own interpretation of Harper, the Serrano court
held that the state's financing system irrefutably classified school-
previously ruled were essentially equivalent to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. The court stated that the analysis of the plaintiff's federal equal protection
claim also applied to the state claim. Id.
155 Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
155 Id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
357 Id. at 605-06, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
355 Id, at 605-06, 487 P.2d at 1256, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
355 Id. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
leo Id.
161 Id. The California Constitution, the Serrano court noted, used almost the same
rationale for establishing a public school system. Id. This state constitutional provision stated
that schools were to be established because a general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence
was essential to the preservation of rights and liberties of the people. Id. See infra note 453
For the text of the California Constitution.
152 Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
September 19911	 SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM	 1127
children on the basis of the "suspect" category of wealth.' 63 These
decisions placed the burden on the state to prove that the method
by which it financed public schools was necessary to serve a com-
pelling state interest. The state of California was thus required to
show that a state interest was so compelling that the fundamental
right to an education should be conditioned by the wealth of a
child's parents, neighbors and school district.'"
The state of California's rationale for the use of local property
taxes to partially fund the schools was to encourage local control of
the schools' administration and financial matters.m In evaluating
this "local control" argument, the California Supreme Court ob-
served that in terms of the goal of leaving administrative control
with the school district, no matter how the state decided to finance
its system of education, it could still leave decisions concerning
teachers, curriculum and other matters to the local districts.' 66 The
state's second contention, that the use of local property taxes for
school funding provided school districts with local fiscal control, was
met with disbelief.' 67 The Serrano court termed the idea of fiscal
freewill under such a system a "cruel illusion" for poor school
districts.'" The court thus rejected the local control argument, and
held that an absolute right to an education required that a public
school financing system not make a child's education a function of
the wealth of the school district in which he or she lives. 169
The Serrano decision had an immediate impact on many courts
considering school finance issues, and most courts found the Serrano
analysis of the fourteenth amendment requirement persuasive."°
Only the United States District Court in Maryland, in the 1972 case
of Parker v. Mandel, disagreed with the Serrano conclusion that state
school funding systems should be subject to the strict scrutiny of
the court."' But though the Parker court's concerns about the Ser-
rano reasoning would eventually be repeated in large part by the
United States Supreme Court, 172 in 1971 it was the Serrano decision
166 Id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
Ina Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 95 Cal, Rptr. at 619-20.
166 Id, at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
166 Id.
167 Id,
168 Id. at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
160 See id.
1 " See School Finance Reform, supra note I, at 87-88.
in Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (D. Md. 1972).
172 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973). The Supreme
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that received nationwide attention.'" After the Serrano decision was
announced, a groundswell of school finance litigation emerged
across the country, and by 1973, over thirty school finance cases
based on the fourteenth amendment were working their way
through the courts.' 74
B. The United States Supreme Court Bows Out: The Impact of
Rodriguez on the "First Wave" of Reform
Given the disagreement that existed among lower courts on the
interpretation of fundamental rights and suspect categories under
the fourteenth amendment, and the number of school finance cases
working their way through the courts, it was likely that the Supreme
Court would review a school finance case. 175 In 1973, at the height
of the school finance reform movement, the Supreme Court did
consider a lower court decision that declared the Texas state system
of financing schools unconstitutional.' 76 In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the lower court and held that the inequities in state school fund-
ing under the Texas school financing system did not violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 77
At the time the Rodriguez suit was filed, local property taxes
provided 41.1% of the school budget in Texas, which resulted in
significant differences in per pupil expenditures among the school
districts.'" The state of Texas did not dispute that its significant
reliance on local property taxes to fund the schools produced ob-
vious disparities in per pupil expenditures, and that state aid failed
to offset this difference. 179 The Supreme Court noted that the state
of Texas had virtually conceded that this type of system could not
withstand the strict scrutiny standard, and that the state could not
show a compelling state interest that justified this unequal distri-
bution of school funds.' 8° The key issue, the Supreme Court ob-
served, thus became whether the strict scrutiny standard needed to
Court described the analysis process of the Serrano and Van Du.sartz courts as "simplistic" in
relation to the "suspect" categories arguments. Id.
'" School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 88.
' 74 Id.
' 75 Id.
175 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5.
177 Id.
178 See id. at 12- 13.
179 See id. at 16.
IQ Id. at 16.
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be applied to the state school financing law.' 8 ' If the Supreme Court
held that the strict scrutiny standard applied, and that the Texas
system was unconstitutional, the Court recognized that it would in
effect be holding the school financing systems of most other states
unconstitutional as well.' 82
The Supreme Court, however, held that the proper level of
scrutiny for review of a state's school financing system was the
rational basis test,'" and that the Texas system of financing schools
was thus constitutional. 184 In reaching this decision, the Supreme
Court first rejected the argument that such plans were unconstitu-
tional because they discriminated against the "poor" on the basis of
the suspect category of wealth.'" In prior cases where the Supreme
Court had considered discrimination on the basis of wealth as a
"suspect category," the class of people in question was completely
unable to pay for some benefit, and, as a result, sustained an ab-
solute deprivation of the benefit.'" The undefined "poor" in the
Texas case, however, were not totally deprived of a public education,
and hence the Supreme Court held that the concept of wealth as a
suspect category was inappropriately applied in the Texas school
finance case.' 87
In reaching its decision to apply the rational basis test in Rod-
riguez, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument that education
was a fundamental right under the federal constitution.'" The
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of education in our so-
ciety as expressed in Brown and other decisions.'" The important
"' See id. at 44.
182 Id.
"3 Id. at 40.
194 See id. at 54.
I85
 See id. at 19.
186
 Id. at 22-23.
I" Id. at 25. The case presented by the Rodriguez plaintiffs differed from previous cases
decided by the Supreme Court in which a classification based on wealth had been subject to
strict scrutiny because those plaintiffs had been totally deprived of a right. Id. at 20-25. The
Texas plaintiffs, however, were not arguing that they had been absolutely deprived of an
education, and the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not require
absolute educational equality or precisely equal educational advantages. Id. at 23-24. In view
of the infinite number of variables affecting the educational process, the Supreme Court
stated that it did not see how any system could assure equal quality of education except in
the most relative sense. Id. at 24. The State of Texas, through its Minimum Foundation
Program, asserted that it provided an adequate education to all children in the state, and
the Supreme Court held that an adequate education was sufficient to meet federal consti-
tutional requirements. See id. at 24.
In Id. at 29-31.
'89 Id. at 30.
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role that education plays in our society, however, did not mean,
according to the Court, that it must regard education as fundamen-
tal for the purposes of examination under the federal equal pro-
tection clause.' 90 Instead, to determine if the right to an education
was fundamental, the Supreme Court ruled that the proper ap-
proach was to examine the federal constitution to determine if the
"right" was explicitly or implicitly guaranteed. 19 ' A right to an ed-
ucation was not explicitly guaranteed in the federal constitution,
and the Supreme Court held that the fact that education supported
the right to free speech and the right to vote did not give education
the status of an implied right. 192 As long as the state of Texas school
system provided the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment
of free speech and full participation in the political process, the
Texas school financing system was constitutional. 193
In reaching its conclusion that the Texas school financing plan
was constitutional, the Supreme Court also expressed a number of
reservations about the school finance cases,'" and the Supreme
Court's role in this controversy.' 95 For example, the Supreme Court
did not feel that research evidence was sufficient to prove that the
amount of money expended by schools actually influenced the ed-
ucational achievement of children.' 98 The Rodriguez Court also
noted that taxation was an area in which courts had traditionally
deferred to legislatures.'" The Supreme Court was concerned that
invalidating the local property tax as a basis for school funding
might make all local fiscal schemes related to health, education and
welfare benefits provided by local governments the subjects of crit-
icism under the equal protection clause.' 98
With respect to its own role in this controversy, the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez indicated that the Texas school finance reform
case was an inappropriate case for intervention because the Court
did not have the .specialized knowledge and experience necessary
to justify interfering with judgments made at the state and local
level.' 99 The Supreme Court further observed that every claim aris-
I" Id. at 31.
191 Id. at 33.
192 Id. at 35.
199 Id. at 37.
194
 See id. at 23-24.
199
 Id. at 41-44.
196 Id. at 23-24.
192 Id. at 40.
198 See id. at 37,41.
199 Id. at 42.
September 19911	 SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM	 1131
ing under the equal protection clause had implications for the bal-
ance of power between national and state governments under our
federal system. 20° In refusing to extend the mantle of fourteenth
amendment protection to cases involving inequities in school fi-
nancing systems, the Supreme Court noted that it found it difficult
to imagine a case that would have a greater impact upon the federal
system than a case in which the Supreme Court was being urged to
invalidate the way in which almost all states had chosen to fund
their own systems of public education.20 '
The Rodriguez decision had immediate implications for two
types of school finance cases: those in which decisions had already
been made, and those that had been filed but not yet acted upon. 202
In the first instance, at the time that the Supreme Court announced
the Rodriguez decision, courts in Arizona, California, Kansas, Mich-
igan and Minnesota had issued decisions declaring their respective
state school financing systems unconstitutional based largely on the
fourteenth amendment. 203 Courts in these states had varying re-
sponses to Rodriguez.
In the Kansas and Minnesota cases, for example, both of which
had been tried in federal district court, the courts took no further
action after Rodriguez. 204 In Michigan, however, after Rodriguez, the
Michigan Supreme Court vacated its earlier 1972 decision in Milli-
ken v. Green. in which the court had declared the Michigan system
of financing schools unconstitutional. 2°5 In Arizona, after the Rod-
riguez decision was handed down, the Arizona Supreme Court in
Shofstall v. Hollins reversed a trial court's decision that the Arizona
system of financing public schools discriminated against taxpayers
in property-poor school districts by taxing them at higher rates for
less services. 20"
206 Id. at 44.
201 Id.
202 See School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 96.
"3 Serrano v, Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 618-19, 487 P.2d 1241, 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
626 (1971), appeal after remand, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert.
denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Van Dusartz v, Hatfield, 334 F. Supp.
870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971); Caldwell v. Kansas, Civil No. 50616 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 1972);
Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (1). Md. 1972) (in accord with Rodriguez); Shofstall
v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 89, 515 P.2d 590, 591 (1973).
264 Van Dusartz, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971); Caldwell, Civil No. 50616 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 1972). In Kansas, the state legislature passed new school finance legislation
after the court declared the system unconstitutional. W.N. Grubb, The First Round of Legislative
Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38 LAW & ConrrEmP. Pions. 459, 459 (1974).
2"' 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972).
166 110 Ariz. 88, 89, 515 P.2d 590, 591 (1973).
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In California, however, the original decision of the Serrano
court declaring the California system of financing schools uncon-
stitutional did not change after Rodriguez, though it was affirmed
on other grounds. 207 The California Supreme Court had originally
remanded Serrano to the trial court to determine if the facts alleged
in the original 1971 case were true.208 In 1976, in Serrano v. Priest
11, the California Supreme Court held that the California system of
financing schools was unconstitutional. 209
 Instead of basing its de-
cision on the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, how-
ever, the Serrano II decision was based on the equal protection clause
of the state constitution. Applying the Serrano I fourteenth amend-
ment analysis to the California state constitution, the Serrano II court
held that the state plan for financing schools was unconstitutional
because it classified children on the basis of the suspect category of
wealth, and interfered with the exercise of a fundamental right to
an education. 21 °
In addition to those states where decisions had been handed
down, the Rodriguez case had a potential impact on school finance
cases in progress. 2 " At the time of the Rodriguez decision, thirty-
five school finance cases were pending, all of which were based in
whole or in part on the fourteenth amendment argument. 212 Com-
mentators assessing the impact of Rodriguez concluded that to the
extent that these cases were based on the fourteenth amendment,
Rodriguez had probably disposed of them. 2 's These commentators,
however, thought it was difficult to predict the outcome of school
finance cases that were based in part on their state's equal protection
clause or state education provisions authorizing the establishment
of public schools.214 Although those interested in school finance
reform would clearly now have to turn to their state constitutions
for a legal remedy to unequal school financing, it was less obvious
what the response of state courts would be. 218






9 " School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 96.
212 See id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 98-99.
2 " Id.
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III. THE SECOND WAVE OF THE SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
MOVEMENT: STATE BY STATE
A. The Persuasive Impact of Robinson v. Cahill
The question of the success of school finance reform in the
state courts did not remain unanswered for long. 216 In April of
1973, just days after the United States Supreme Court announced
Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill de-
clared the New Jersey system of financing schools unconstitu-
tional. 217 The Robinson court reached this decision because it con-
cluded that the funding disparities that existed among the New
Jersey school districts did not meet the state constitutional require-
ment that the public school system be "thorough and efficient." 218
The Robinson court based its holding on findings by the trial
court that documented significant differences in per pupil expen-
ditures among school districts because local funds derived from
property taxes accounted for sixty-seven percent of the school bud-
get.219 The trial court also found that a significant connection ex-
isted between the sums expended and the quality of the educational
opportunity received. 22° Given these disparities in educational op-
portunity, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a thor-
ough and efficient education was not being provided to all children,
and that the state's financing system was unconstitutional.221
In reaching this decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court traced
the history of the state constitutional provision authorizing the es-
tablishment of public schools, as well as the history of subsequent
amendments to the provision. 222 The New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that an equal educational opportunity for all children
was precisely what the framers of the constitution had in mind in
mandating a thorough and efficient system of education. In con-
cluding that the existing statutory scheme of financing public
216 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), was decided April
23, 1973. Robinson v. Cahill was technically decided April 3, 1973, but the opinion was
modified to reflect the Rodriguez decision before Robinson was published. See Robinson, 62 N.J.
473, 473, 303 A.2d 273, 273 (1973).
217 62 N.J. at 480, 303 A.2d at 276.
216 Id.
216 Id. at 481, 303 A.2d at 276-77.
226 Id. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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schools did not meet the thorough and efficient standard, the court
noted that the state had not even spelled out the content of the
educational opportunity the state constitution required. The New
Jersey Supreme Court directed the state to define the content of
the education to be provided to New Jersey children, and then
revise the funding system to ensure that this education would be
provided to all. 223
In addition to alleging that the current system of financing
schools denied children from property-poor school districts a thor-
ough and efficient education, the Robinson plaintiffs also alleged
that the New Jersey system of financing schools violated the federal
and state equal protection clauses by interfering with the exercise
of a fundamental right, and by classifying children on the basis of
the suspect category of wealth. 224 With respect to the fourteenth
amendment argument, the Robinson court believed that Rodriguez
had eliminated its use in school finance reform cases. Courts had
not yet, however, considered the use of the "fundamental rights"
and "wealth as suspect category" arguments under the state equal
protection clause. 22'
In considering whether wealth was a suspect category, the New
Jersey Supreme Court observed that "wealth" was not at all suspect
as a basis for raising revenues. 229 Although it was true that the
amount of locally raised revenues varied among school districts, the
court noted that education was in this respect no different than
other local government services such as police, fire and health. 227 If
differences in local expenditures for services handled by the local
governments were in and of themselves unconstitutional, the Rob-
inson court observed that the entire political structure of local con-
trol of local services would be fundamentally changed.228 Concur-
ring with Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that
it was unwise to find local taxation for education unconstitutional
because that decision could make local taxes an equally impermis-
sible means of providing other necessary local services. 229
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the Rod-
riguez decision on the topic of wealth, it believed that in defining a
12, Id.
22' See id, at 492, 303 A.2d at 276-77.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 486-90, 303 A.2d at 279-82,
222 See 2d. at 493-94, 303 A.2d at 283.
228 Id. at 489, 303 A.2d at 281.
229 Id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 282.
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fundamental right as one that was explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
in the constitution, the Supreme Court had chosen an approach
that was "immediately vulnerable" upon further analysis. 25° The
Robinson court observed that the right to acquire and hold property
was guaranteed in both the federal and New Jersey state constitu-
tions, but the court did not believe that mention in a constitution
automatically made property rights a candidate for preferred treat-
ment."' The Robinson court thus rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that education was a fundamental right because the state constitu-
tion provided for public education. Instead, the Robinson court con-
cluded that in determining if a state law violates the equal protection
clause, the court must employ a balancing test, and weigh the nature
of the restraint or denial against the apparent public justification." 2
In balancing the state interest in local control over local services
with the funding disparities among the state's school districts, the
Robinson court held that the New Jersey system of financing public
schools did not violate the state's equal protection clause.
The Robinson decision, then, provided a new model for school
finance reform cases, but one that was not entirely helpful to those
interested in reducing funding disparities among a state's school
districts. 253 Robinson demonstrated that a successful argument could
be made, on the basis of a state's education provision, that unequal
school expenditures were unconstitutional. 234 The Robinson court
also pointed out, however, why it considered the state equal protec-
tion clause to be an inappropriate basis for making a constitutional
decision on the validity of a state's school financing plan. In rejecting
both the "fundamental rights" and "wealth as a suspect category"
arguments, the Robinson court left plaintiffs with a single legal basis
on which a successful school finance case could be mounted. 235 This
remaining education provision argument could only be successfully
argued if the plaintiffs could show that a school finance system that
resulted in substantial funding disparities among the state's school
districts was inconsistent with the meaning of the state education
provision.236
236 Id.
231 Id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 282.
232 Id. at 497, 303 A.2d at 285.
233 See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 799, 537 P.2d 635, 641 (1975).
2" See 62 N.J. 473, 473, 303 A.2d 273, 273 (1973).
235 Id. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
236 Compare Thompson, 96 Idaho at 799, 537 P.2d at 641 (Idaho system of financing
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B. 1974-1984: A Decade of Mixed Results and Limited Success
The New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinson, along
with the reasoning in the Rodriguez and Serrano cases, guided the
decisions of many of the courts that considered school finance cases
after 1973.237 Between 1974 and 1984, in this second wave of the
reform movement, courts in Montana (1974), Idaho (1975), Illinois
(1976), Oregon (1976), Connecticut (1977), Pennsylvania (1978),
Washington (1974, 1978), Wyoming (1978), Ohio (1979), West Vir-
ginia (1979), Georgia (1981), Colorado (1982), Arkansas (1983),
Maryland (1983), New York (1983) and Michigan (1984) considered
the constitutionality of their respective school finance systems. 238 of
these sixteen cases, only in Connecticut (1977), Washington (1978),
Wyoming (1978), West Virginia (1979) and Arkansas (1983) did
state supreme courts declare their respective state plans for financ-
ing schools unconstitutional, often citing the Serrano II and Robinson
decisions. 239 In the eleven states that declared their school financing
systems constitutional, however, courts also cited Robinson in reach-
ing their decision, though the Robinson court had declared the New
Jersey state school financing system unconstitutional. 24°
One of the first of the post-Rodriguez decisions, the 1975 case
of Thompson v. Engelking, illustrates the varying effect that the Rob-
inson opinion had on courts that found their state systems of fi-
nancing schools constitutional in the second wave of the school
finance reform movement."' In Thompson, the Idaho Supreme
4'7
	 generally Thompson, 96 Idaho at 799, 537 P.2d at 641.
228 Cases in which the courts held their state financing plans constitutional include:
Lujan v. Colorado Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas,
248 Ga. 632, 644, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1981); Illinois ex reL Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App. 3d
189, 200, 350 N.E.2d 767, 776 (1976); Thompson, 96 Idaho at 799, 537 P.2d at 641 (1975);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 644-45, 609-610, 458 A.2d 758,
783-84, 765 (1983); East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 133 Mich. App. 132, 137-38, 348
N.W.2d 303, 305-06 (1984); State ex rel. Woodahl, 164 Mont. 141, 145, 520 P.2d 776, 779
(1974). Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643, 653 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 387, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825
(1979); Olsen v. State ex rel. Johnson, 277 Or. 9, 18, 554 P.2d 139, 149 (1976); Danson v.
Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 429, 399 A.2d 360; 367 (1979).
Cases in which the court held the school finance system unconstitutional include: Dupree
v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 345, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983); Horton v. Meskill,
172 Conn. 615, 648-49, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (1977); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90
Wash. 476, 526-27, 585 P.2d 71, 98-99 (1978); Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 719, 255
S.E.2d 859, 884 (1979); Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo. 1980).
2" See supra note 238.
240 See, e.g., Thompson, 96 Idaho at 799, 537 P.2d at 641.
411 Id. at 793, 537 P.2d at 635. Several other cases were similarly handled by their
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Court held that significant funding disparities among the state's
school districts violated neither the federal or state equal protection
clauses, nor the requirement that the state provide a "uniform"
system of schools. 242 It found Rodriguez dispositive of the fourteenth
amendment question, 243 and concurred with Robinson that if courts
found local taxes for school support unconstitutional under a state
equal protection argument, local taxes might be unconstitutional
for all other local services funded in this manner. 244
On the issue of education as a fundamental right under the
state constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court in Thompson also agreed
with the Robinson court that the mere mention of education in the
state constitution did not make education a fundamental right. 245
The Idaho Supreme Court broke with the Robinson court, however,
in its interpretation of the Idaho provision requiring the legislature
to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system
of public, free, common schools. 246 Though the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Robinson had found its system unconstitutional on
a similarly worded "thorough and efficient" clause, the Thompson
court held that this clause did not mean that equal educational
expenditures were required and that the Idaho system was there-
fore constitutional. 247
While courts like the Idaho Supreme Court were faced with
the traditional school finance issue of disparities in funding among
a state's school districts, in three cases decided in the second wave
of the school finance reform movement, plaintiffs presented a some-
what different argument for declaring a state school financing plan
unconstitutional. In these cases, city school districts were the plain-
tiffs seeking court-ordered reform. 248 These city school districts
presented a new argument for declaring their respective state fund-
respective courts. In 1976, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court, like the Idaho Supreme
Court, held in Olsen v. State ex. rel Johnson that its system of financing public schools was
constitutional. 277 Or. 9, 18, 554 P.2d 139, 149 (1976). In 1982, the Supreme Court of
Colorado in Lujan v. Colorado Board of Education followed much the same pattern as the Idaho
and Oregon courts had in declaring the Colorado financing system constitutional. 649 P.2d
1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982).
242 Thompson, 96 Idaho at 799, 537 P.2d at 641.
24 '4 Id. at 800, 537 P.2d at 642.
249 Id. at 804, 537 P.2d at 646-647.
245 Id. at 804, 537 P.2d at 646.
246 Id. at 805, 537 P.2d at 647.
247 Id.
248 Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 607, 458 A.2d 758, 764
(1983); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y,2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643, 653 (1982); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 418, 399 A.2d 360, 362 (1978).
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ing systems unconstitutional. This argument essentially involved
municipal overburden, and the difficulty that city school districts
often had in getting adequate funds from a city that had many
other budget needs to consider. 249 Repeating many of the facts that
the Civil Rights Commission had identified in its 1966 discussion of
municipal overburden over a decade before these cases, these cities
charged that they had to spend more on noneducational needs than
the suburbs, and also had more poor children who needed greater,
not lesser, aid for their education. 25° In all three cases, however,
courts rejected the municipal overburden argument and held their
respective state systems of financing schools constitutional. 251
Although the majority of the courts that considered the con-
stitutionality of state public school funding plans in the "second
wave of reform" declared their systems constitutional, in Arkansas,
Connecticut, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming, courts
reached the opposite conclusion. 252 In declaring their systems un-
constitutional, however, courts in these five states reached identical
conclusions using differing legal bases for their decisions. In Ar-
kansas and Wyoming, for example, courts followed the Serrano II
approach and declared their systems of financing education uncon-
stitutional on the basis of the state's equal protection clause. 253 In
Arkansas, the reason for this decision was the court's finding that
its financing system categorized children on the basis of the wealth
of their school district. 254 In Wyoming, the court also concluded
that the state financing system categorized children on the basis of
the school district's wealth."' In addition, the Wyoming court found
that its system of financing schools violated the state's equal protec-
tion clause because education was a fundamental right. The Wyo-
ming court reached this decision because of the emphasis on edu-
cation in the state's constitution, and the basic importance of
education in modern life. 256
245' Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 607, 458 A.2d at 764; Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 48, 439 N.E.2d at
369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653; Danson, 484 Pa. 415 at 418, 399 A.2d at 362.
256 Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 607, 458 A.2d at 764; Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 48, 439 N.E.2d at
369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653; Damon, 484 Pa. 415 at 418, 399 A.2d at 362.
251
 Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 607, 458 A.2d at 764; Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 48, 439 N.E.2d at
369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653; Danson, 484 Pa. 415 at 418, 399 A.2d at 362.
252 See supra note 238.
253 Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 345, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983);
Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 322 (Wyo. 1980).
254 Dupree, at 344, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
255 Washakie County School Dist, No. I, at 323-24.
256
 Id. at 333.
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In Connecticut, the Connecticut Supreme Court in the 1977
case of Horton v. Meskill also declared its state system of financing
schools unconstitutional on the basis of the state's equal protection
clause. 257 The Connecticut Supreme Court, however, based its de-
cision that education was a fundamental right in Connecticut largely
on the history of education in Connecticut. 258
 The Connecticut
Supreme Court observed that Connecticut had recognized a duty
to provide for the proper education of the young for centuries, and
had a lengthy commitment to free public education. As early as
1650, Connecticut had adopted . the Massachusetts provision that
required towns of fifty or more households to maintain elementary
schools; towns with a hundred or more households had to establish
grammar or secondary schools as wel1. 259
In addition to the historical tradition of education in the state,
the Connecticut Supreme Court also noted that the legislature had
recognized in other contexts the state's concern for each child to
have an equal opportunity to receive a suitable program of educa-
tional experiences. 26" The current situation with regard to financial
disparities between the school districts had arisen over the years,
the Horton court noted, and needed to be corrected. 26 ' The Con-
necticut Supreme Court therefore held that in Connecticut the right
to education was so basic and fundamental that it had to scrutinize
strictly any infringement of that right. 262 The Connecticut Supreme
Court then concluded that the financing system could not withstand
this strict scrutiny test, and declared the public school financing
system unconstitutional. 263
Although the Horton court used the history of the state's edu-
cational efforts to support the finding that education was a funda-
mental right, in the West Virginia case, the court used history to
interpret the language of the state's education provision. 264 In Pauley
v. Kelly, decided in 1979, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia determined the meaning of the "thorough and efficient"
clause of the state's education provision, which eventually led to a
declaration in a subsequent court proceeding that the West Virginia
252
 172 Conn. 615, 647, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (1977).
259 Id. at 647, 376 A.2d at 373-74.
259 Id. at 647, 376 A.2d at 374.
260 id.
261 Id. at 648, 376 A.2d at 374.
262 Id. at 648-49, 376 A.2d at 374.
265 Id.
26' See Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 707-08, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (1979).
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system of financing schools was unconstitutional. 265
 In its delibera-
tions, the Pauley court examined the provision mandating a thor-
ough and efficient school system in terms of the framers' intent, in
terms of how other state constitutions had used the phrase, and in
terms of how the words had been defined both in the past and
present. 266
 Based on this information, the Pauley court identified
the criteria of an efficient school system, and in 1984, a trial court
determined that the West Virginia system of financing schools did
not meet these criteria and was therefore unconstitutional.267
In the fifth state in which courts held a school financing plan
unconstitutional, the need to provide reliable funding for the
schools affected the court's decision. 268 In 1978, in Seattle School
District No. 1 of King County v. State, the Washington Supreme Court
overruled its 1974 decision in Northshore School District No, 417 v.
Kinnear and held the state's system of financing public schools un-
constitutional on the basis of the state education provision: 269 In
Seattle School District, as in Northshore School District, the case con-
cerned the constitutionality of special tax levies, requiring voter
approval, needed to support the schools. 2" During the 1975-76
school year, forty percent of the students in the state resided in
school districts that had to reduce teachers and curriculum offerings
because school districts lost special levy elections. 2 " The loss of these
special levies placed public education in immediate danger, the
Washington Supreme Court stated, and it held the use of these
special levies to fund the basic school program was therefore un-
constitutional. 272
In reaching this decision, the Washington Supreme Court
noted that the state education provision required the state to make
265 Id, at 681-707, 255 S.E.2d at 865-77.
466
	 The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, had held in Robinson in 1973 that
the New Jersey system of financing schools was unconstitutional on the basis of this wording;
the Ohio Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Walter, on the other hand, had found its
financing system constitutional on the basis of virtually identical wording. 58 Ohio St. 2d
368, 387, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (1979).
267
 Pauley v. Bailey II, 324 S.E.2d 128, 130 (W. Va. 1984).
265
 Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 526-27, 585 P.2d at 98-99
(1978).
262 Id. In Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 688, 530 P.2d 1178,
1181 (1974), plaintiffs also argued that the use of the property tax to partially fund schools
was unconstitutional. Id. The plaintiffs further argued that taxpayers in property-poor school
districts were denied the equal protection of the law because they paid a higher percentage
of taxes for less educational services. Id.
272
 Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d at 711, 530 P.2d at 193; Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d
at 526-27, 585 P.2d at 98-99.
271 Seattle School Dist. No. /, 90 Wash. 2d at 524-25, 585 P.2d at 98.
272 Id.
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"ample provision" for the education of all children, and described
education as the "paramount duty" of the state. 278 A lengthy inter-
pretation of the words of this provision, and an extensive historical
analysis of the context in which the education provision was
adopted, led the court to conclude that the state had a mandatory
duty to provide for an ample education for all children, and that
the current financing plan was insufficient to provide for a basic
education. 274
 Special tax levies could be used for enrichment pro-
grams, the Seattle court noted, but they were an unreliable means
of funding the basic education program and were therefore uncon-
stitutional when used in that context. 275
In the second wave of the school finance reform movement,
then, courts in five of the sixteen states where cases were decided
between 1974 and 1984 declared their systems of financing schools
unconstitutional. 276
 In Wyoming and Connecticut, education was
declared to be a fundamental right. 277
 The Connecticut Supreme
Court reached this decision largely because of the lengthy commit-
ment to free public education in the state, which dated to 1650,
whereas the Wyoming Supreme Court based its decision on the
emphasis on education in the state's constitution, and on the basic
role of education in society. 278 The Wyoming Supreme Court, as
well as the Arkansas Supreme Court, also held that its state financ-
ing system was unconstitutional because it conditioned the quality
of a child's education on the wealth of his or her school district. 279
In Washington and West Virginia, on the other hand, courts ex-
amined the context in which the education provision was passed,
the intent of the framers, and the meaning of the words in the state
education provision, before declaring that their respective state
school financing plans violated their state constitution's education
provision. 280
Although courts in Arkansas, Connecticut, Washington, West
Virginia and Wyoming did declare their state system of financing
93 Ste id. at 495;526, 585 P.2d at 83, 99.
2" Id. at 514, 585 P.2d at 93.
379 Id. at 527, 585 P.2d at 99.
279 See supra note 238.
2" Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 648-49, 376 A.2d 359; 374 (1977); Washakie
County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
279 Horton, 172 Conn. at 648-49, 376 A.2d at 374; Washakie County School Dist. No. 1,
606 P.2d at 310.
279
 Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 345, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983);
Washakie County School Dist. No. 1, 606 P.2d at 310.
299
 Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 476, 526-27, 585 P.2d 71, 98-99 (1978);
Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 719, 255 S,E.2d 859, 884 (1979).
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public schools unconstitutional, the vast majority of the state courts
considering school finance cases in this second wave of the reform
movement reached the opposite conclusion. 281
 Plaintiffs in the sec-
ond wave of the school finance reform movement found that courts
were not persuaded by efforts to factually distinguish Rodriguez, and
all courts making decisions between 1974 and 1984 held that Rod-
riguez effectively eliminated the fourteenth amendment as a basis
for seeking school finance reform. Almost all of these courts also
agreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinson,
and therefore rejected the use of the state equal protection clause
as a basis for declaring a state's school finance system unconstitu-
tional. That left plaintiffs with only one other basis upon which to
constitutionally challenge a state school funding system, 282
 The re-
maining argument, however, based on the alleged violation of the
state education provision, was necessarily fact-specific to a given
state and plaintiffs in each state thus had to generate their own
historical information to support this position. 2" As the Thompson
and Robinson cases indicated, even states with similarly worded ed-
ucation provisions could reach opposite interpretations of this
clause depending upon the strength of the case the plaintiffs were
able to present. 284
 Indeed, in this second wave of the school finance
reform movement, the education provision argument failed more
often than it succeeded. 288
Whether plaintiffs argued that funding disparities among a
state's school district were unconstitutional then, or that the state's
funding pattern did not take into account the municipal burden
faced by cities, most of the courts considering school finance reform
between 1974 and 1984 found their respective state systems of
281
 See supra note 238.
282
 See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 799, 537 P.2d 635, 641 (1975).
285 See id.
284 See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 473, 303 A.2d 273, 273 (1973); Thompson, 96
Idaho at 799, 537 P.2d at 641.
285
 The state provision argument was successful during the second wave of reform
(1974-1984) in Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 476, 526-27, 585 P.2d 71, 98-
99 (1978), and Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 719, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (1979). It was not
successful in Lujan v. Colorado Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel
v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 644, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho
793, 799, 537 P.2d 635, 641 (1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md..
597, 644-45, 609-10, 458 A.2d 758, 783-84 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d
27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 653 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58
Ohio St. 2c1 368, 387, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (1979); Olsen v. State ex rel. Johnson, 277 Or. 9,
18, 554 P.2d 139, 149 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 429, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (1979).
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financing schools constitutional. 286 As this period drew to a close,
the trend in favor of declaring school finance systems constitutional
continued, even where significant funding differences existed
among school districts. 287
In 1984, for example, in what would be the last case decided
in the second wave of the school finance reform movement, the
Michigan Court of Appeals in East fack,son Public Schools v. Green
rejected a second challenge to the state's unequal method of funding
schools and found the system constitutional. 288 Plaintiffs in Illinois
were similarly unsuccessful in a second constitutional challenge to
their state school financing plan. 289 The record for unsuccessful
challenges, however, appeared to belong to Georgia, where plain-
tiffs actually filed four separate cases unsuccessfully challenging the
constitutionality of the Georgia system of financing schools. 29° For
the Georgia plaintiffs, as for most school finance reform plaintiffs,
the state by state approach to seeking school finance reform proved
to be less than satisfactory.
IV. THE THIRD WAVE OF REFORM: RENEWED INTEREST IN SCHOOL
FINANCE REFORM, AND A RETURN TO "EDUCATIONAL NEEDS"
A. The State Education Provision Argument Triumphs
Between 1984 and 1987, for the first time since the school
finance reform movement began in the late 1960s, there were no
decisions on the constitutionality of a state's plan for financing
public schools. 29 ' When the next decision on this issue did come in
1987, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not even allow the plain-
tiffs to present their case. Instead, the court followed the dominant
trend in the school finance reform movement and declared the
Oklahoma state school finance plan constitutiona1. 292 When the
South Carolina Supreme Court followed suit in 1988 and upheld
the constitutionality of that state's shared public school funding
286 See supra note '26.
4P7 See, e.g., East Jackson Pub, Schools v. State, 133 Mich. App. 132,137-38,348 N.W.2d
303,305-06 (1984).
288 Id. at 137-38, '348 N.W,2d at 305-06.
289 Illinois ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 III. App. 3d 189, 200, 305 N.E.2d 767, 776 (1976).
290 Battle v. Cherry, 339 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ga. 1972); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga.
632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Ingram v. Payton, 222 Ga, 503, 150 S.E.2d 825 (1966); Rice v.
Cook, 222 Ga. 499, 150 S.E.2d 822 (1966).
291 See supra note 25.
292 Fair School Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1151 (Okla. 1987).
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system,298 the effort to seek equality of educational opportunity
through court-ordered school finance reform seemed to have lost
much of its momentum.
Then, in 1989, within months of each other, courts in Kentucky,
Montana and Texas declared their respective state school funding
systems unconstitutional. 294 This outcome was a milestone of sorts
in the school finance reform movement, because it was the first time
in its twenty-one year history that three states declared their systems
of financing schools unconstitutional in the same year. 295 Moreover,
many similarities existed between the three cases, both in terms of
the plaintiffs' cases, and the manner in which the respective courts
reached their decisions. 296
In the 1989 Kentucky, Montana and Texas cases, for example,
plaintiffs alleged the same basic fact pattern first postulated in
Serrano a generation ago; that is, that public school funding, and
hence the quality of education, varied significantly among school
districts within the state. 297 Following the Serrano pattern, in all three
cases plaintiffs alleged that these funding disparities resulted in a
lack of equal educational opportunity.298 In all three cases the fund-
ing variation that the plaintiffs sought to reduce was due to the
partial use of local property taxes to fund the schools, which in turn
could be traced to the variations in property wealth among the
school districts. 299 Following the Serrano model, in all three cases
the plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment seeking to have
the state's public school financing system declared unconstitu-
tional."° The courts in all three cases based their decisions on the
premise that the state legislature would restructure the system, and
29" Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 350, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1988).
29" Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary
School Dist. No. 1. v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 47, 769 P.2d 684, 691 (1989); Edgewood Indep.
School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391; 396 (Tex. 1989).
"9 See supra note 25.
"3 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 47, 769
P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 396.
- 297 Rose, 790 S,W.2d at 197; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1., 236 Mont. at 47, 769
P.2d at 686-87; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 392:
29" Rose, 90 S.W.2d at 197; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 49, 769
P.2d at 686-87; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 393.
299
 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 48, 769
P.2d at 686-87; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 393.
." Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 47, 769
P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 392.
September 1991]	 SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM	 1145
avoided ruling that exactly equal expenditures were required to
equalize educational opportunity."'
In addition, the 1989 Kentucky, Montana and Texas cases were
all decided on the basis of the same legal argument."' Following
the 1973 lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v.
Cahill, the Kentucky, Montana and Texas courts rejected the plain-
tiffs' arguments that their respective state financing plans violated
the federal or the state equal protection clause.'" Instead, all three
courts chose to base their decisions on the meaning of the provision
in their respective state constitutions that authorized the legislature
to establish free public schools." Though the wording of the ed-
ucation provisions differed, the three courts followed the same
procedure in analyzing the issue, as they examined the history of
the constitutional provision, the intent of the framers and the mean-
ing of the words in the statute.'"
In Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State, for example,
the plaintiffs charged that the Montana system of financing public
schools violated the constitutional provision that the "goal of the
people" was to establish a system of education that would develop
the "full educational potential of each person."'" The education
article of the Montana Constitution further provided that "equality
of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the
state."'" The plaintiffs charged that because of the disparities in
funding among school districts, which at the time of the suit were
as high as eight to one, all children did not have equal educational
opportunity.'" The plaintiffs provided both expert testimony and
the results of a comparison study to establish that these funding
disparities resulted in differences among school districts in educa-
3" Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Helena Elementary School Disi, No. 1, 236 Mont. at 55, 769
P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 396, 399.
S°4
	 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at
65, 769 P.2d at 691 and Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 398 with Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
in Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 65, 769
P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 398.
"4 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 189; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 55, 769
P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 398.
3" Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 194-95; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 55-
56, 769 P.2d at 689-90; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 393-94.
"6 See 236 Mont. at 52, 769 P.2d at 689.
307 Id.
'5" Id. at 48-51, 769 P.2d at 686-88.
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tional opportunity in terms of curriculum, textbooks, materials,
supplies and facilities." Given these disparities, the Montana Su-
preme Court declared the financing system unconstitutional. 31 °
In analyzing whether this system of financing schools violated
the education provision of the Montana State Constitution, the
Montana Supreme Court looked first to the constitutional debates
on the provision, and to the plain meaning of its words. 3 " The
education provision, the court noted, was the only place in the state
constitution where a right was guaranteed. The plain meaning of
the education provision, the court determined, was that every per-
son is guaranteed equality of educational opportunity. 312 This guar-
antee was binding on all three branches of the government, the
court stated, and applied to each person in the state of Montana. 313
In terms of whether the current financing system provided such
an equal opportunity, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the
state's contribution fell short of even meeting the costs of complying
with Montana's minimum school accreditation standards. 314
 As a
result, school districts were forced to rely heavily on permissive and
voted levies, which voters could reject.315 The fact that Montana
had experienced fiscal difficulties in the last few years did not, the
court ruled, excuse the disparities in spending in the various school
districts. 316 These disparities translated into unequal educational
opportunities for students, and thus violated the Montana consti-
tutional provision that guaranteed equal educational opportunity
for all." 7
In Kentucky, in Rose v. Council for Better Education, the Kentucky
Supreme Court in 1989 held that the system by which Kentucky
funded its schools violated the state constitutional mandate to "pro-
vide an efficient system of common schools."3 " The court noted
that the evidence that the plaintiffs presented clearly established
that the state inadequately funded the entire Kentucky public edu-
cation system. 319 In addition, there were significant differences in
5" Id. at 48-49, 769 P.2d at 686-87.
"° Id.
311 Id. at 53, 769 P.2d at 689.
313 Id. at 53, 769 P.2d at 689-90.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 53-54, 769 P.2d at 690.
315 Id. at 55, 769 P.2d at 690.
316 Id. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690.
317 Id.
313 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989).
"9 Id.
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the taxable property per pupil among school districts, which trans-
lated into differences in the amount of money expended on edu-
cation in a school district. 320 This difference in per pupil expendi-
tures in turn led to a significant difference between the poor and
wealthy school districts in terms of teachers' salaries, educational
materials, curriculum and facilities, as well as a difference in edu-
cational achievement among the school districts."'
In determining whether the method by which Kentucky schools
were financed could be considered to meet the "efficient" mandate
of the state constitution, the Kentucky Supreme Court surveyed the
history of the education provision, and considered the opinions of
other courts and experts as to the meaning of the term "efficient." 322
The court determined that "efficient" included the concept that the
common schools should be substantially uniform throughout the
state, and that the state should provide equal educational oppor-
tunity to all Kentucky children. 323 The court concluded that the
present system of education in Kentucky did not meet these guide-
lines, and emphasized that the entire system was unconstitutional,
including all statutes that created, implemented and financed the
system.324 The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that it had made its
decision only on the grounds of the education provision in the state
constitution, but that the basis for the opinion was that education
was a fundamental right under the Kentucky constitution."'
The third 1989 school finance case arose in Texas, and involved
the constitutionality of the state school financing system that the
United States Supreme Court had held was constitutional a gener-
ation earlier in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez. 326 In Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, how-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion,
The Texas Supreme Court based its 1989 holding of unconstitu-
tionality not on the fourteenth amendment, which had been the
legal basis for the Rodriguez case, but on the state constitution's
education provision. The Texas State Constitution, like the Ken-
tucky and New Jersey constitutions, required the legislature to es-
22°
 Id. at 196.
321 Id. at 197-98.
"2 Id. at 194-96,205-13.
322 Id. at 211.
321
 Id. at 215.
322 Id.
322 Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391,396 (Tex. 1989).
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tablish and provide an "efficient system" of free public schools. 327
Like the Massachusetts education provision, the state was to main-
tain schools because a "general diffusion of knowledge" was essen-
tial to the preservation of the "liberties and rights" of the people. 328
In interpreting the Texas State Constitution's education pro-
vision, the Texas Supreme Court examined the intent of the fram-
ers, the historical context in which the provision was passed, and
the plain meaning of the words in the provision. 329
 It noted that
the provision imposed on the legislature an affirmative duty to
establish an efficient system of schools. "Efficient," in turn, meant
the same in 1875 when the constitution was adopted as it meant
today, and implied not a system that was cheap, but one that was
effective and produced results. 33° The court further reasoned that
the framers could never have anticipated the existence of the type
of disparities in property values that caused the unequal funding
that existed among Texas school districts in 1989. When the Texas
education provision was adopted in the 1800s, school districts were
uniformly funded. The Texas Supreme Court therefore held that
the present financing system, which resulted in per pupil expendi-
tures ranging from $2,112 to $19,333, was not constitutional be-
cause,children from property-poor school districts were not receiv-
ing an efficient or effective education which "diffused
knowledge."331 .
The 1989 Kentucky, Montana and Texas cases, then, inaugu-
rated a new phase in, the school finance reform movement. Based
on the model first developed in Serrano v. Priest in 1971, courts in
these three cases held that funding disparities among a state's school
districts did affect the quality of educational opportunity that a child
received. 332
 Following the model developed in the 1973 case of
Robinson v. Cahill, the courts in all three of these cases rejected equal
protection arguments and instead based their decisions of uncon- -
stitutionality on the meaning of the state constitution's education
provision."' In reaching these decisions, the courts each first de-
" 7
 Id. at 393.
3"
 Id. Sec infra note 453 for the complete text of the Texas and Massachusetts consti-
tutional provisions on education.
329 Id. at 394.
"° Id.
331 Id.
3S2 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 189; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 55, 769
P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 398.
3" 777 S.W.2d at 378.
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termined the meaning of the state education provision by examining
the plain meaning of the words, the intent of the framers, and the
historical context in which the clause had been adopted. 3" Having
determined the meaning of the constitutional provision, each court
then examined the current system of financing schools to determine
if the funding inequities that existed among the state's school dis-
tricts violated the state constitutional provision. 333
B. The Revival of the "Educational Needs" Argument
• At the same time that reformers in Montana, Kentucky and
Texas found renewed success in arguing that unequal school ex-
penditures among a state's school districts were unconstitutional,
the "educational needs" argument was revived. 356 The essence of
the educational needs argument, first raised in 1968 in McInnis v.
Ogilvie, is that equal educational opportunity requires expenditures
based on the educational needs of the children. 3" The concept be-
hind this argument is that many children are educationally disad-
vantaged because of their background and' therefore cannot carn 7,
pete with advantaged youngsters. 538 According to . ,tliis argument, :
these disadvantaged children need special compensatory programs
if they are to achieve equally with other children. 339
 • •.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the 1989 case of Kukor v.
Grover, was the first  court to consider, and to reject, this revived
educational needs argument. 34° One year later, however, in the 1990
case of Abbott v. Burke, the New Jersey Supreme Court defined equal
educational opportunity in terms of educational needs and held
that certain poorer urban school districts did not provide a thor-
ough and efficient education as required by the state constitution's
education provision."' The New Jersey Supreme Court had pre-
554 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 194-95; Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 55-
56, 769 P.2d at 689-90; Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 393-94.
333 Id.
"U See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990); Kukor v. Grover,
148 Wis. 2d 469, 484, 436 N,W,2c1 568, 574 (1989).
3" School Finance Reform, supra note 1, at 83-84.
33" Id.
.130 Id.
5" 148 Wis. 2d at 484, 436 N.W.2d at 574. It was the second time that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had dealt with school'financing issues, having previously ruled in Buse v.
Smith that a plan to have wealthy school districts share their excess revenues with property
poor school districts was unconstitutional. Buse v, Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 550, 247 N.W.2d
147, 147 (1976).
341 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990).
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viously declared its entire system of financing schools unconstitu-
tional in the 1973 case of Robinson v. Cahill because funding dispar-
ities among the state's school districts failed to provide children with
equal educational opportunity through equal access to equally
funded school programs. 342 In the 1990 Abbott case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court examined the financing system that the legislature
had designed to meet the Robinson court's 1973 constitutional ob-
jections. 343
The Abbott court held that despite changes in the state's plan
for financing public schools, vast disparities in educational expen-
ditures in the New Jersey school system continued to exist because
of differences in property values. 394 These fiscal differences, caused
by the continued use of the property tax to fund schools, translated
into differences in the input into a child's education. The Abbott
court noted that the present law did allow the commissioner of
education to order a district to increase its taxes if its educational
system was deficient. The court, however, accepted the Abbott plain-
tiffs' municipal overburden argument, which had been used by
earlier plaintiffs in the 1970s, and reasoned that this provision was
useless because the cities were already suffering from municipal
overburden and had no funds. The court also noted that the state
had presented convincing evidence that money alone would not
result in equality of educational opportunity. 945 The New Jersey
Supreme Court, however, concluded that money could make a dif-
ference, and that poor urban students were constitutionally entitled
. to the same type of educational opportunity that money bought for
other children. 346
In reaching its decision that the current financing system was
unconstitutional as applied to certain court-identified poor urban
school districts, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that students
in poorer urban districts were unable to participate fully as citizens
and workers in society, or to achieve any level of equality in soci-
ety."' Without an effective education, these poor students were
likely to remain isolated in deteriorating cities. 348 The New Jersey
Supreme Court also noted that the educational deficiencies of these
"2 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 473, 303 A.2d 273, 273 (1973).
1" 119 N.J. at 298, 575 A.2d at 363.
2" Id, at 323, 575 A.2d at 377.
646 Id. at 295-96, 575 A.2d at 363.
"6 Id.
542 Id. at 384-85, 575 A.2d at 408.
"" Id. at 391-92, 575 A.2d at 411.
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poor urban school districts had an impact not only on the students,
but on the social, cultural and economic fabric of the state."" Failure
to correct the deficiencies in the educational system, the court be-
lieved, would likely lead to despair, bitterness and hostility on the
part of the minority, undereducated poor.""
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott held that in order to
provide a thorough and efficient education in these poorer districts,
the state must ensure that it addressed the special disadvantages of
these students so that they received an education equally effective
to that provided their more affluent peers."' The court ruled that
school funding for these school districts could therefore not depend
on the fiscal ability or will of local school boards, but must be
guaranteed by the state. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott
made this ground-breaking decision even though the state of New
Jersey at the time of the suit had one of the highest per capita
expenditures for public education in the nation. 352 For despite this
financial effort, the court believed that students in these poor urban
districts were not receiving a thorough and efficient education.
In the closing paragraphs of the Abbott opinion, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reminded the parties involved in this litigation that
it was indeed the students and their education that was the real
focus of this school finance case.'" After the court had completed
all of its legal analyses of school finance issues, the court noted that
it was still left with the need to deal with these students and the
reality of the poverty and isolation of their lives. These poor chil-
dren were not being educated, the court held, and it found this
constitutional failure to be "dear, severe, extensive, and of long
duration."354
 In defining equal educational opportunity in terms of
student needs, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott added yet
another chapter to the evolving and changing story of the legal
concept of equal educational opportunity.
Beginning in 1989, then, the school finance reform movement
entered a new phase. After over two decades of almost continuous
litigation over disparities in school funding among school districts
within the same state, more courts in 1989 declared their systems
of financing public schools unconstitutional in a single year than
349 Id. at 392, 575 A.2d at 411.
35° Id, at 393, 575 A.2d at 412.
"I Id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408,
952 Id. at 393, 575 A.2d at 412.
153 Id. at 394, 575 A.2d at 412.
784 Id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408.
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had done so in the previous twenty-one years. 355 Defining equality
of educational opportunity in terms of the need to reduce funding
disparities among school districts, and to provide equal access to
equally funded programs, the three cases decided in 1989 gave new
life to a movement that previously had limited success. 356
In addition to experiencing new success with the traditional
school finance case model developed in Serrano v. Priest, the emer-
gence of a second branch characterized this new phase of the school
finance reform movement. 357 Based on the educational needs ar-
gument first used in 1968, a 1990 court decision declared a state
system of financing schools unconstitutional in part because it did
not provide sufficient funds to meet the needs of minority inner-
city youth and provide them with an equally effective education. 358
In addition to requiring that sufficient funds be allocated to meet
the special needs of these disadvantaged children, this court also
held that the state must ensure that the necessary funds were avail-
able. 359
 This court focused its attention on the children involved in
the case, and held that school funding for these disadvantaged
children could not depend upon the ability or willingness of local
school districts to provide the programs that these children needed
to be able to participate fully in society. 36°
V. THE STATISTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR
CHALLENGING THE LEGALITY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SYSTEM OF
FUNDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The history of the twenty-two year school finance reform move-
ment suggests that plaintiffs considering a constitutional challenge
to their state's system of financing public schools need to collect
facts specific to their state in three key areas in order to assess the
viability of a potential case. First, plaintiffs need information that
focuses on their state's current system of financing schools in order
to determine if it is characterized by the three factual bases used
"3 See supra note 25.
"6 Compare Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d at 190; Helena Elementary School
Dist. No. 1, 236 Mont. at 55, 769 P.2d at 689-90 and Edgewood Indep. School Dist., 777 S.W.2d
at 398 with Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
"' See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990); Kukor v. Grover,
148 Wis. 2d 469, 484, 436 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1989).
333 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363.
3" See id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408.
"0 Id. at 394, 575 A.2d at 412.
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successfully in previous school finance cases; 561 namely, if significant
funding differences exist among school districts caused by the use
of local property tax revenue or municipal overburden; if the reli-
ance on local property tax revenue, or the lack of guaranteed state
funds, results in school districts being unable to be assured of ad-
equate funds to provide children a basic education; and if the
disadvantaged children in the state are receiving the type of edu-
cation that compensates for their background and allows them to
achieve in school and society. 362
A second area in which potential plaintiffs in a school finance
reform case need to collect facts specific to their state involves the
state's equal protection clause, including the history of education in
the state, and the relative emphasis that the state constitution places
on education. Previous plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated
that education was a fundamental right in their state by presenting
information on the history of education in their state, the state
constitution's emphasis on education, and other contexts in which
the legislature addressed the question of equality of educational
opportunity.363
 This argument, of course, presupposes that the state
has an equal protection clause, or, as in the case of Massachusetts,
several clauses considered to be the equivalent of the fourteenth
athendment. 364
A third area in which potential plaintiffs need to collect facts
specific'to their state involves the meaning of the state provision on
education:' Previous plaintiffs have examined the history of the
edUcafion provision, the context in which the state's education pro-
visio'n was adopted, the intent of the framers, and the plain meaning
of the words in order to support the argument that unequal fi-
nancing is unconstitutional. 365 Massachusetts plaintiffs can be ex-
5W See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190 (unequal school funding among school districts);
Helena Elementary School Dist. No.1, 236 Mont. at 55, 769 P.2d at 691 (adequate guaranteed
funding not available).
562 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190; Helena Elementary School Dist. No.1, 236 Mont. at
55, 769 P.2d at 691.
363 See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 648-49, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (1977);
Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
364 Articles I, VI, VII and X are the Massachusetts equivalent of the fourteenth amend-
ment. American Connor v. Metropolitan Dist. Water Supply Comm., 314 Mass. 33, 38, 39,
49 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1943) (discussing alleged taking of land without adequate compensation).
365 See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 473, 303 A.2d 273, 273 (1973); Rose, 790 S.W.2d
at 190; Helena Elementary School Dist. No.1, 236 Mont. at 55, 769 P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep.
School Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 398; Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 476, 526-27,
585 P.2d 71, 98-99 (1978); Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 719, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (1979).
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pected to follow a similar pattern, because Massachusetts courts in
previous unrelated cases have used similar guidelines, 366 construing
the constitution in light of the conditions under which it was framed,
the ends it was designed to accomplish, the benefits it was expected
to confer, and the evils it hoped to remedy. 367
This section, then, presents statistical and historical data that,
based on previous successful school finance cases, may prove useful
to potential plaintiffs assessing the viability of a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Massachusetts system of financing public schools. 368 It
is designed to ascertain whether the current educational financing
system in Massachusetts contravenes the fourteenth amendment by
totally depriving children of an education, or depriving children of
the minimum skills that they need to participate in the political
process; 369 whether the current financing system provides unequal
funding that supports the proposition that a child's education in
Massachusetts is illegally conditioned on the "suspect" category of
wealth and violates the state's equal protection clause; 370 whether
there is evidence that education in Massachusetts is a fundamental
right which under the state's equal protection clause must be made
available to all children on equal terms; 3" and whether unequal
funding among school districts, lack of adequate guaranteed state
funding to provide a basic education to all children, or failure to
provide an education that effectively meets the needs of disadvan-
taged youth violates the state constitution's education provision. 372
sss See infra note 453 fora complete text of this portion of the Massachusetts Constitution.
In interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution, one must construe the language of the
constitutional provision in accordance with the common understanding at the time of the
adoption of the constitution. Raymcr v. Trefrey, 239 Mass. 411, 412, 132 N.E. 190, 191
(1921) (discussing tax abatement clue under constitution). Courts are to interpret words and
phrases in the sense most obvious to common understanding. Opinion of the Justices to the
House of Representatives, 243 Mass. 605, 607, 140 N.E. 963, 464 (1923) (discussing proposed
constitutional amendment). In construing constitutional provisions, Massachusetts courts look
to the history of the times when the state made the constitution. Opinion of the Justices to
the House of Representatives, 254 Mass. 617, 619, 151 N.E. 680, 681 (1926) (discussing
applicability of referendum to proposed apportionment bill).
367
 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 324 Mass. 746, 749, 85 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1949)
(discussing constitutionality of bill defining public highways).
sss See, e.g., Robinson, 62 N.J. at 473, 303 A.2d at 273.
36 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 5 (1973).
s" See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 345, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93
(1983).
371 See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 648-99, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (1977).
372 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990); Seattle School
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 476, 526-27, 585 P.2d 71, 98-99 {1978); Pauley v. Kelley, 162
W. Va. 672, 719, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (1979).
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A. The Statistical Basis for a Constitutional Challenge to the
Massachusetts System of Financing Schools
Chapter 71 of the General Laws of Massachusetts reqtiires that
all towns and cities in Massachusetts maintain public schools.'" The
state funds its schools through state aid, local property taxes and
federal funds. 374 According to the statute, state funds are provided
under chapter 70 in order to promote the equalization of educa-
tional opportunity, reduce reliance on the local property tax, and
promote the equalization of the burden of the cost of school sup-
port. 375
While the state does provide aid to schools, the majority of the
funds needed to support public schools in Massachusetts in fiscal
year 1988 came from property tax revenue raised by cities and
towns. Thus, in fiscal year 1988, on average, 53.8% of the schools'
budget came from local funds raised by property taxes. 376 Massa-
chusetts school districts varied significantly, however, in terms of
their ability to raise funds because of differences in local property
values. 377 This property value difference, in turn, was reflected in
varying school expenditures, with differences of $2,000 per pupil,
or $60,000 per thirty-child classroom, not unusual. 378 The amount
of local funds that a school district contributed to its schools also
varied somewhat depending on the percentage of its budget that
the municipality allocated to support the schools, and the willingness
"3 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 71, I (1988),
"4 See generally Massachusetts Department of Education, Bureau of Data Collection and
Processing "School District Comparisons of Boston, Brookline, Lawrence," (FY 1988-89)
thereinafter School District Comparisons].
333 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 70, § 2 (1988). In fiscal year 1988, the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, through this general fund and additional programs, contributed 38.76% of the
overall budget of Massachusetts schools. See generally School District Comparisons, supra note
374. In terms of individual school districts, the actual contribution that the state made to the
education effort varied considerably. Id. Some cities, for example, are heavily dependent on
state funds to support their schools. State funds accounted for 85% of Lawrence's school
budget, 70% of Holyoke's budget, and 57% of Lynn's budget. In other districts, state funds
make up a relatively low percentage of the overall school budget. State funds thus accounted
for only 11.8% of Brookline's budget, 12.8% of Newton's budget, 14% of Watertown's budget,
and 27% of Boston's budget. Id.
"5 Id.
"7 Id.
335 See generally id. Copies of these documents were obtained at the Massachusetts
Department of Education. For "All Day Programs," the per pupil expenditure in 1989-1990
ranged from $2,389 (Wales) to $36,465 (Gosnold), with the state average $4,526 per pupil.
Id. (Summary of All Day Programs). A total of 18 towns spent under $3,000 per pupil per
year of all day programs, Id. A total of 42 spent over $6,000 per pupil. Heath had only a
special needs program and was not included in these figures. Id.
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of the people to assess themselves for local municipal services, in-
cluding schools. 378
In addition to differences in fiscal ability and willingness to
expend money on public education, school districts in Massachusetts
also vary in the demands placed on the schools because the low-
income, minority, bilingual and limited-English speaking popula-
tions in Massachusetts are not evenly distributed. 3" Statewide, for
example, in fiscal year 1988, 16.1% of the children in public schools
were minorities, and 11.2% were considered "low income." 881
 Less
than ten percent of the children statewide were classified as "bilin-
gual," and approximately four percent were classified as having
"limited English." 382 In, contrast to these state averages, in some
Massachusetts towns over half of the children are low-income and
bilingual, while in other towns this same population is less than
three percent of the public school student body. Those towns with
more special populations tend to be funded at a lower level than
towns with relatively few special needs children. 383
In addition to the significant differences in per pupil expen-
ditures which exist among Massachusetts school districts, some corn-,
mentators have characterized the entire school financing system in
Massachusetts as inadequately funded . 384 Many Massachusetts
school districts, for example, are currently facing severe budget
problems. 388 In Massachusetts, school districts must compete with
other municipal programs for their share of funding froth property
tax revenue. 388 In light of the economic downturn, 387 cities are





3" See generally id. Newton, for example, had less than two percent of its students
classified as low income in 1988; less than three percent had limited English, and a little over
ten percent were bilingual. Newton, however, expended $5,873 per pupil, well above the
state average and thousands of dollars per pupil above the expenditure level of school districts
like Lawrence, Holyoke and Lynn, which had large numbers of poor, minority, bilingual or
limited English-speaking children. Id.
334 See generally Coletsos, /9 Mass. Schools Get Low Grades, Boston Globe, Nov. 22, 1990,
at A58, col. 6 [hereinafter Low Grades].
"5 Cuts site Hard in Newton's Schools, Newton Graphic, Jan. 16, 1991, at 1, col. 3
[hereinafter Cuts]; Low Grades, supra note 384, at col. 1.
see
5" Id.
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cuts.388 In some cases these budget cuts have resulted in such severe
curtailments of the school programs that school accreditation is
threatened . 389
For the first time in twenty-one years, a Massachusetts high
school risked losing accreditation ► in the spring of 1991; in total,
fifteen Massachusetts high schools were in danger of losing their
accreditation in 1990-91. 3" Most of the troubled schools, according
to Robert O'Donnell, the Chairman of the New England Association
of Schools and Colleges, were in blue-collar communities that could
not afford to fund their schools adequately."' O'Donnell blamed
Proposition 2 1/2 for this problem because it limits the amount by
which local taxes may be raised without resort to a special election
to override the 2 1/2 percent limit on new spending. 392 In Dracut,
for example, the senior high school was put on probation last year
because of poor facilities.'" Last spring, however, despite this pro-
bationary status, the voters failed to pass a Proposition 2 1/2 over-
ride."' Prior to the passage of Proposition 2 1/2, school boards
could have sought state intervention when schools were inade-
quately funded, but no such option now exists.'"
Other commentators, however, pinpoint not Proposition 2 1/2,
but mismanagement of funds and inadequate state aid as the source
of school funding problems. 388 A recent study of public spending
in Massachusetts indicates that Massachusetts spends approximately
$900 less per public school pupil than it would be expected to spend
given the state's characteristics. 387 In contrast, Massachusetts spends
about $1,500 more per person for public welfare than might nor-
5" Id.
389 Low Grades, supra note 384, at col. L
39° Id.
391 Id.
399 Id. Proposition 2 1/2 is the popular name for MASS. GEN. L. ch. 580. This statute sets
a limit of two and one-half percent on the amount by which local taxes may be raised over
the previous year's taxes without special voter approval. North Shore Vocational Regional
School v. City of Salem, 393 Mass. 354, 355, 471 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1984).
393 Low Grades, supra note 384, at col. 1, 2.
394 Id.
395 See generally Pirrone v. City of Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 405, 305 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1973).
Boston was treated somewhat differently with regard to this law when it was in effect. See id.
at 405, 305 N.E.2d at 99.
"g Low Grades, supra note 384, at col. 1, 2.
397 Mold, Study: Mass. Stands Apart on Spending, Boston Globe, Nov. 14, 1990, at 31, col.
3.
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mally be expected. 398 In 1990, Massachusetts ranked forty-fifth in
the nation in terms of the percentage of state-generated school
funding. 399
Regardless of the cause, the lack of adequate guaranteed funds
may be affecting both the children and the teachers in Massachu-
setts public schools. Between 1989 and 1990, the percentage of
students in Massachusetts passing state-mandated minimum com-
petency tests in grades three, six, and nine dropped for the first
time since the state administered the tests in 1987. 40° A spokesman
attributed the statewide decline in scores to cuts in the state edu-
cation budget, loss of support staff and special enrichment pro-
grams, and the layoff threat that loomed over 10,000 teachers last
year. 40 ' Indeed, in some municipalities like Boston, conflicts over
appropriations between the school committees that administer the
schools, and the city government that allots city funds, continued
throughout the year, with threatened layoffs and program cuts still
being proposed well after school had begun. 4°2
The current system of financing public schools in Massachu-
setts, then, is characterized by significant differences in per pupil
expenditures among the state's school districts. 403 Children from
poor areas of the state, some of whom have high educational needs,
have significantly less money spent on their education than children
in more affluent areas of the state.404 Though the state legislature
in chapter 70 legislation recognized the state's responsibility to fund
the schools, the need to equalize the burden of school support, and
the need to reduce the reliance on the property tax, the state of
Massachusetts provides less than half of the funds needed by school
districts to support state-mandated schools, 405 and apparently did
not provide sufficient school funds to ensure that all schools could
meet even minimum accreditation standards. 406 In addition, school
393 Id.
399 Cohen, Weld Cuts Would Drop School Aid to 49th in the U.S., Boston Globe, Feb. 9,
1991, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Weld Cuts].
4°° See Cuts, supra note 385, at 1, col. 3.
401 McDonough Offers Added School Cuts But Committee Members Are Rductant,.Boston Globe,
Nov. 27, 1990, at 22, col. I. School Test Scores Decline, Boston Globe, March 25, 1991, at 17,
col. 2, 18, col. 1; Raynolds: Test Scores Reflect Budget Cuts, Boston Globe, March 26, 1991, at
25, col. 2-5, 28, col. 1 .
402 McDonough Offers Added School Cuts But Committee Members Are Reluctant, Boston Globe,
Nov. 27, 1990, at 22, col. 1.
4°' See School District Comparisons, .supra note 374.
404 Id.
4°5 Weld Cuts, supra note 399, at col. 1.
493 Low Grades, supra note 384, at col. 1, 2.
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districts vary considerably in their ability to raise funds because of
differences in property tax values. Moreover, cities are allowed to
expend varying portions of their budget for public education, and
to tax themselves to support the schools at varying rates. 407 Yet, in
the wake of Proposition 2 1/2, the state has left school districts, and
the children they serve, with nowhere to turn if voters fail to ap-
prove the local funds needed to run the schools: 108
B. The Constitutional Basis for a Challenge to the Legality of the
Massachusetts System for Funding Public Schools
The picture of Massachusetts schools in 1990 painted by these
statistics—threatened loss of accreditation, state funding among the
lowest in the nation, thousands of dollars' difference among school
districts in per pupil expenditures, falling test scores in basic skills
areas—seems to be in sharp contrast to the Massachusetts historical
tradition of educational excellence." If one examines the history
of public education in Massachusetts, one finds that even in colonial
times Massachusetts was a leader in public education.u° Indeed it
was the model of public education developed by the Puritans of
Massachusetts that provided the very principles upon which all
American public education is based. 4 " Moreover, it was in part the
contribution that the Massachusetts public education system had
made to the struggle to form a democratic government in America
that led the framers to include an education provision in the first
Massachusetts constitution. 412 According to historians, this unique
constitutional provision embodied a conception of education "far
ahead of its time."413
' 7 See School District Comparisons, supra note 374.
4°8 See generally Pirrone v. City of Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 405, 305 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1973).
4°' See generally E. P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1-80 (1926).
Although this note discusses Massachusetts public education only through the time that the
Massachusetts Constitution was adopted in 1780, the leadership that Massachusetts provided
in public education for the rest of the country after this date is well documented in Cubber-
ley's book. See generally id.
41° Id. at 23.
4" Id.
4 ' 2 S PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, MAgcn 1779—FEBRUARY 1780 229 (1989) (editorial note)
(hereinafter PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS]. Massachusetts was the first state to submit its consti-
tution directly to the people for ratification. Bellingham, Colrain, and Sutton were the only
towns to vote against the education provision. 0. AND M. HANDLIN, THE POPULAR SOURCES
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780 29
(1966).
' 13 Cubberley, supra note 409, at 89-90.
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Massachusetts adopted the education provision in its state con-
stitution in 1780 as part of the original Massachusetts Constitution,
and it remains unchanged today.414 Penned by John Adams, it was
the first state provision for education in America that was directly
ratified by the people, and it was unique in two other respects. First,
it was apparently the only place in the Massachusetts Constitution
in which the word "duty" was used, and thus the only area in which
the people assigned to the legislature an affirmative duty to act. 415
Second, the education provision was unique, according to historian
Hart, simply because it existed 4 16 Most states during this period
had no provision for public schools in their constitutions at all. 417
114 Compare PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 412, at 236, 260 (draft of constitution)
with MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § II (1988). The preliminary deliberations on the Massachu-
setts Constitution actually date from October of 1779, when delegates from three towns met
in Cambridge for the Constitutional Convention. Id. These delegates appointed Convention
President James Bowdoin, Samuel Adams and future United States President John Adams
to draft the constitution. Id. This subcommittee turned the writing of the draft over to former
schoolteacher John Adams, who, in penning the Massachusetts education provision, wrote
the first state provision for education that was directly ratified by the people. Id. Reportedly,
Adams' favorite section of the constitution, this provision reads:
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body
of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties;
and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of educa-
tion in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the
people, it shall be the duty of the legislatures and magistrates, in all future
periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and all the
sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge,
public schools, and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage private societies
and public institutions, by rewards and immunities, for the promotion of agri-
culture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and a natural history
of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and
general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty
and punctuation in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social affec-
tations and generous sentiment among the people.
Id. The wording of this provision is attributable solely to John Adams, as the Convention
and the people of Massachusetts approved the draft of the provision with no change, and
little dissent. Id.
4 " See MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (1988).
4 " A. HART, COMMONWEALTH HISTORY or MASSACHUSETTS 207 (1929).
1 " CLIRRERLEY, supra note 409, at 94-95. Historian E.P. Cubberley reported that New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina and New York, for
example, all framed constitutions in 1777, and none made reference to education. Id. Simi-
larly, Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), Louisiana (1812) and Illinois (1818) made no
reference to education in their first constitutions. Of the states that Cubberley noted had
"good provisions" for education by 1820—Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and Vermont—all but Vermont had apparently based their education provision on sentiments
expressed in the Massachusetts provision. The Vermont constitutional provision for educa-
tion in 1777 expressed a much different idea on education from that which John Adams
would pen, as it provided that the legislature should establish schools to instruct youth "at
low prices." Id.
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The success of John Adams in securing approval for the inclu-
sion of a provision on education in the Massachusetts Constitution
was, in fact, a feat other colonial leaders found difficult to achieve. 418
Thomas Jefferson, for example, had proposed in 1779 that Virginia
approve comprehensive school legislation, but he could not win
approval for his proposal.'" Historian Cubberley noted that Jeffer-
son had difficulty winning approval for this concept because no
precedent existed for public schooling in Virginia for Jefferson to
build on.42° Colonial Virginia had only provided schools for the
poor, and had no history of support for public education. In Mas-
sachusetts, in contrast, the state had mandated compulsory public
schooling that served all children for one hundred and fifty years
before John Adams' constitutional provision on education was pre-
sented to the voters for approval. 42 '
The tradition of public education in Massachusetts, in fact,
dated from the earliest days of the colonial period. 422 The Puritans
of Massachusetts were the first to give form to the concept of free
public education—one of the most important ideas in our country's
history. 423 Through a set of four laws passed in 1634, 1637, 1642
and 1647, the Massachusetts Bay Colony laid the foundation upon
which all American public schools were constructed. These laws
established important new ideas in education: that each town must
provide schooling for all children, that the schools would be sup-
418 Id. at 96.
419 Id. at 89.
420 Id. at 89 n.1
421 See G. MARTIN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 83
(1923). By 1700, there were 29 Latin grammar schools in Massachusetts; all but 10 of the
secondary schools in existence in colonial America in 1700 were, in fact, found in Massachu-
setts. See CUBBERLY, supra note 409, at 30, fig. 6. These Latin grammar schools contributed
much to the fame of the colony as an education center, and it was the grammar schools of
Boston, Braintree, Cambridge, Charlestown, Dorcester, Roxbury and Salem that were the
main feeder schools to Harvard. Id. at 18 n.1, 81 n.1,
422 K. Paulos [Strickland), An Historical Review of Curriculum Research, 1918-1976,
12 (1976) (Doctoral Dissertation available through Dissertation Abstracts). The Puritan
schools, like all of the earliest schools in the United States, were based largely on ideas and
institutions which the colonists brought from Europe. The purpose of the colonial schools
in the United States, like their counterparts in Europe, was based in the church and religion.
The real concern of the colonists was that all children learn to read in order to know the
word of God. Id. at 13. Closely associated with the religious aim of instruction was the desire
for schools to provide ethical and moral training. Id. at 14. Aims of education concerning
the development within pupils of personal and social characteristics such as truth, honesty,
justice, kindness and morality were generally included in statements of purposes of schools.
The religious motive, however, was by far the dominant motive underlying popular education
in the period. Id.
499 CUBBERLEY, supra note 409, at 24.
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ported by equalized and compulsory taxation, and that the state
could compel parents to send their children to schoo1. 424 Moreover,
in contrast to schooling in other parts of colonial America, the
Puritans intended the public schools to serve all children and not
simply the poor, and the schools were to serve the state, and not
just the church. 425
 Though the principle of free public education
was not recognized in all of the northern states in the United States
of America until 1850, the Massachusetts tradition of free public
state-supported compulsory schooling was codified by 1647.
The success that Adams had in penning the first state education
provision directly ratified by the people, then, was in part due to
the strong Puritan tradition of public education that dated from
the mid-seventeenth century. It was a tradition that was very much
alive when Adams wrote the Massachusetts State Constitution, be-
cause the character of public schooling in 1780 was largely un-
changed from Puritan times. Throughout the Revolutionary War
period, for example, as during the Puritan era, few textbooks were
available. 426
 As a result, the education offered when Adams wrote
the state constitution, like the schooling provided in Puritan corn-
424 Id. In colonial America, at least three clearly marked conceptions of education
emerged in early American education. The parochial school concept, represented by Prot-
estant Pennsylvania and Catholic Maryland, saw the church as controlling education with
state interference discouraged. In these schools, education was totally dominated by church
purposes. A second conception of education, reflecting the attitude of the Church of England,
was present in Virginia, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, the Carolinas and Georgia. Id.
These colonies conceived of public education as intended chiefly for orphans and children
of the poor; children from better classes attended private schools. Historical Review, supra
note 422, at 14. In New England, a third concept of education consisted of a religious state
supporting an educational system of common schools, Latin grammar schools and a college.
Significantly, the schools were seen as serving both religious and civic ends. Moreover, the
schools were to instruct all children and be supported by the community. Our modern
American school system evolved out of this concept of education following the separation of
church and state. Id.
445 Id. In evaluating these early laws, Massachusetts historian George Martin noted that
it was important to recognize that the idea underlying these laws was neither paternalistic
nor socialistic. See MARTIN, supra note 421, at 87-88. Schools were to be maintained not
because education was in the best interest of the child, but because the state would suffer if
the child was not educated. The Massachusetts Bay Colony established schools not because
they wanted to relieve parents of the responsibility of educating their children, but because
the Colony would have more assurance that all children were being educated if the state
provided schools. Id.
426
 CUBBERLEY, supra note 409, at 23. At North Grammar School, for example, the
curriculum was described as "the Accidence ... Aesop Fables ... Clarkes Introduction . . . Tunics
Epistles . . . Homer." A scholar who attended John Lovell's Latin School in Boston from 1752
to 1759 reported: "We studied Latin from 8 o'clock till 11, and from 1 till dark . . . ." See R.
SEYBOLT, THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF COLONIAL BOSTON, 1663-1775,72-73 (1969).
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munities, was much simpler than today, and quite uniform through-
out the commonwealth. 427 As simple as this schooling was, however,
the schooling offered in Massachusetts when the state constitution
was adopted was significantly superior to that available in other
colonies both in terms of the number of schools, and their reputa-
tion.428 And though there were apparently some inland districts
around the time of the Revolutionary War that were reluctant to
continue their financial support of town schools, Massachusetts
nevertheless passed the education provision in the state constitution
with little opposition. 429
4" CUBBERLEY, supra note 409, at 111. Although the character of public education
remained generally unchanged from colonial clays, after 1750, two gradual changes in
education occurred in the Massachusetts Bay Colony that had a profound effect not only on
schools in Massachusetts, but also on the future organization of public schools across the
United States. One key change that would affect the nature and control of the public schools
in Massachusetts was the waning of religious influence throughout the colony. Id. at 59. By
the end of the 1600s, town taxes supported schools and the only power of the minister was
to accompany the town authorities in the visitation of schools: Id. at 74. The public schools
in Massachusetts thus gradually moved from being "church" to state schools. Id. at 74-75.
Massachusetts schools had always been placed under civil control, but before 1700 the civil
and religious authorities were the same. Id. at 73. After 1750, the schools were clearly a
function of the civic government, and by the time the Revolutionary War was fought, the
people of Massachusetts saw the schools as under the control of the state. Id. at 75.
This decline in the importance of religion, in the schools and in the everyday life of the
colonists as well, occurred in conjunction with another change—the breakdown of the New
England "town." Id. at 68. Originally, each New England settlement was a unit varying in
size from 20 to 40 square miles, and each of these units were called "towns." At the center
of each town was a meeting house, and later the town school and town hall were built there.
Id. at 69. All colonists had to live within one-half mile of the town center, send their children
to town schools, and attend town meetings where the issues of the town and colony were
discussed. Toward the end of the 1600s, this compact form of settlement disintegrated as
the colonists began to scatter out and live on farming land. New settlements arose within the
towns that were miles away from meeting halls and schoolhouses. The scattered colonists
could not easily attend church in winter, and children could not possibly attend school. Id.
By 1725, there were many isolated settlements in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Id. at
70. The colonists began to subdivide the town, and each subdivision fought for and soon
obtained "local" rights. The first "local" right obtained by the subdivisions was to appoint
their own minister, and then the subdivisions won the right to maintain their own roads.
This growth of district-consciousness affected the schools, and each district either wanted its
own school or it wanted the town school moved around the town so that all children had
equal access to the school. Id. at 72-73. The colonists first tried to solve this problem by
moving the town school from district to district. Later, each district was allowed to take back
its tax from the town, and each district paid for and maintained its own school. By 1789,
each school district in Massachusetts was able to elect school trustees, levy school district taxes
and select teachers. This rise of the school district as the unit for school maintenance would
eventually modify the future educational administration in almost every state, as, once again,
a Massachusetts innovation set the pattern for American education. Id. at 68.
428 See generally id. at 17-31.
09 Id. at 59. Cubberley reported that younger people had founded the new towns
1 169
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:1 1 05
The state provision on education penned by John Adams, then,
not surprisingly reflected this continuing Puritan tradition. In ad-
dition, Adams, like other colonial leaders, recognized the impor-
tance of the Puritan tradition in education for the future of Mas-
sachusetts and the nation. 430
 As early as 1765, for example, Adams
had discussed the importance of the Puritan heritage and their
educational efforts in a "Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal
Law."43 ' He considered the Puritan tradition in Massachusetts to be
the ideal that his generation should follow. 432 Adams and other state
leaders appreciated the contribution that the educational system
founded by the Puritans had made to the movement for indepen-
dence. As Governor of Massachusetts, John Hancock noted that
education was the most efficient of the means by which the govern-
ment had been raised to its "present height of prosperity." 433 The
early schools, he wrote, had enabled citizens to form and establish
a civil constitution calculated to preserve their rights and liberties. 434
The education provision that John Adams penned, however,
reflected not only the Puritan heritage, but also the new role that
the leaders of a new democratic nation envisioned for education. 435
John Adams, like many state and national leaders, perceived the
schools as an arm of the civil government that would provide the
people with knowledge of use to them in their moral, political and
located in the wilderness away from the coast, and they had less interest in religion and
learning than the original colonists. The inland towns also found financial support of public
schools a heavy burden, and by 1750 there was a clear desire on the parts of the western
towns for relief at least from the maintenance of a Latin grammar school, which seemed to
many to be inadequate for the needs of the youth of a new land. Id. at 61-62,61 n.l.
In a 1779 letter to John Adams, Samuel Adams wrote of his great fear that some of the
gentlemen in the "Country" had begun to think that supporting public schools was too great
a financial burden. H. CUSHING, IV THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, 1778-1802 124 (1908).
Id. "I wish," he wrote, "that they could hear the Enconiums that are given to N[ewl England]
by some of the most sensible and publick spirited Gentlemen in the southern States, for the
Care and Experience which have been freely borne by our Ancestors & continued to this
time for the Instruction of youth . . ." Id. If "Virtue and Knowledge," Samuel Adams
continued, "are diffused among the people then [the people] will never be enslavd." Id.
Samuel Adams, who later became Governor of Massachusetts, concluded that he hoped that
his countrymen would never depart from the principles and maxims that the [Puritan]
forefathers of Massachusetts handed down. Id.
4,° J. HOWE, THE CHANCING POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS 40-42 (1966).
431 Id.
"2 M. Gordon, Union With A Virtuous Past, The Development of School Reform in
Massachusetts, 1789-1837,9 (1974) (Doctoral dissertation available through Boston College).
455 CUBBERLEY, supra note 409, at 90.
"4 Id. at 88-91.
444
 See generally al., at 88-91.
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civic duties. 436 The legislature was to "cherish" the elementary and
secondary schools, and all types of educational institutions, and to
promote a broad range of practical and academic subjects, including
agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures and nat-
ural history. 437 This schooling should include, Adams observed, "not
merely . . . children of the rich and noble, but [children] of every
rank and class of people, down to the lowest and poorest."'" Several
years later, in 1793, Governor John Hancock confirmed that Mas-
sachusetts public schools apparently were meeting this goal, as he
observed in an address to the state legislature that the grammar
[elementary] and secondary schools offered "equal advantages" to
rich and poor.439
In describing the type of education that was to be universally
offered to the rich and the poor, Adams intentionally painted a
broad picture of "education."44° This intentionally broad portrayal
of education in the constitutional provision was matched by a broad
range of values that education was expected to inculcate in the
people."' Historian Hart interpreted this portion of the constitu-
tional provision on education as describing a new role for the school
in terms of the socialization of children. 442 He noted that the edu-
cation provision was a general plea for the diffusion of "virtue" as
well as "knowledge," and reported that Adams adopted this concept
of "virtue" from the French philosopher Montesquieu. 443 Virtue
meant, in essence, that the people would be capable of using their
own power wisely, and when necessary, would sacrifice their own
455 Gordon, supra note 432, at 15. Adams emphasized this civic purpose for education,
and the importance of a broad and universal education, when he wrote:
The instruction of the people in every kind of knowledge that can be of use to
them in the practice of their political and civic duties as members of society .
ought to be the care of the public, and of all who have any share in the conduct
of its affairs, in a manner that never yet has been practiced in any age or nation.
CussEatxv, supra note 409, at 90.
457 MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2.
455 CHRRERLEY, supra note 409, at 90.
459 Id.
"0 See PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 412, at 233. One immediate objective that
John Adams had in writing this section, historians note, was the establishment of an academy
of men interested in arts, natural science and natural history, especially that of the United
States. Adams reportedly suggested that such an institution, which he hoped to model on
the great academies of England and France, be founded in 1779. In 1780, the year the
constitution was adopted, Massachusetts did indeed charter the "American Academy of Arts
and Sciences." Id.
441 See MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch, V, 2 (1988).
445 See HART, supra note 416, at 207.
443 Id.
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immediate good for the public good. 444
 In addition to encouraging
the development of "virtue," the constitutional provision also re-
flected the belief that education could inculcate a wide range of
moral qualities, including humanity and general benevolence, pub-
lic and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty, sincerity,
good humor and "all social affectations and generous sentiment
among people."445
This role of education as a means of socializing children, which
Adams expressed in the constitutional provision, was apparently
widely held, In 1789, the Massachusetts legislature formally codified
the earlier Puritan laws requiring that towns maintain schools,
though technically the Puritan laws on education had remained in
effect under the new constitution.446
 In passing this law, the legis-
lature specified what subjects the schools were to teach, adding a
new provision on teaching morals. The 
. 1789 law required that
schools teach not only reading and writing, but also orthography
and decent behavior. The teachers were to help their students un-
derstand that virtues such as piety, justice, industry and frugality
would preserve and perfect the constitution, and secure the blessing
of liberty. 447
The Massachusetts provision on education, then, was originally
adopted in 1780 and remains unchanged today. When adopted, this
provision signified the importance that Massachusetts citizens at-
tached to education simply by its existence in the state constitu-
tion.448
 This importance was further underlined by the lengthy,
detailed nature of the provision, which apparently contained the
only place in the constitution where the people specifically assigned
a "duty" to the state, and charged the legislature with an affirmative
duty to act. 449
This education provision was adopted at a time when schooling
was relatively uniform across the state, and when state leaders ex-
tolled the value of these public schools because they provided an
equal advantage to rich and poor. 45° It was also adopted at a time
when Massachusetts was a leader in education, both in terms of the
quantity and quality of public schools, and when, following the 150
444 HOWE, supra note 430, at 88.
"5 MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (1988).
446 MARTIN, supra note 421, at 87-88.
441 Id.
448 See HANDLIN, supra note 412, at 29.
445 See MASS. CoNs-r. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (1988).
4" CUBBERLEY, supra note 409, at 90.
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year-old Puritan tradition, Massachusetts considered school attend-
ance so important that it, unlike many other states, required parents
to send their children to schoo1.4" The education provision was also
adopted at a time when state leaders envisioned a universal and
broad education as a means to improve society, to preserve the
rights and liberties of the people, and to develop good citizens and
socialize children.452 Finally, this provision expressed a view on the
role of education that other states apparently found compelling, as
the Massachusetts provision on education appears to have served
as a model for the education provisions in ten other states. 453
451
 Id. at 23.
452 See generally id., supra note 409, at 88-91.
"5 Arkansas, California, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, North Dakota, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Rhode Island and Texas all have education provisions that are similar in thought to
that of Massachusetts.
In New Hampshire, the education provision reads:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being es-
sential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading of the oppor-
tunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the country,
being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators
and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the interest
of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage
private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of
agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and natural history
of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and
general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and economy, honesty
and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affectations, and generous
sentiments, among the people.
N.H. CoNsT. art. 83.
Other state provisions similar to that of Massachusetts are somewhat shorter. The Ar-
kansas provision, for example, reads as follows: "Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards
of liberty and bulwark of a free and good government, that State shall ever maintain a
general, suitable, and efficient system of free public schools." ARK. CONST. art. 14.
The California provision, for example, reads: "A general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement." CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
The Indiana provision reads:
Knowledge and learning: generally diffused throughout a community, being
essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, sci-
entific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and
uniform system of Common schools.
IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
Maine's constitutional provision reads:
A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the pre-
servation of the rights and liberties of the people; to promote this important
object, the Legislature are authorized, and it shall be their duty to require, the
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VI. THE VIABILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE
MASSACHUSETTS SYSTEM OF FINANCING SCHOOLS
Between 1968 and 1990, courts in twenty-eight states consid-
ered the constitutionality of their state school financing plans. In
challenging the constitutionality of these plans, plaintiffs sought
court-ordered reform because the finance system resulted in un-
equal funding among the state's school districts, failed to ensure an
adequate guaranteed source of income to provide a basic education,
or failed to fund education on the basis of the needs of children.
These plaintiffs have used three different legal arguments to estab-
several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support
and maintenance of public schools.
MAINE CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
The Missouri provision reads: "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general assembly
shall establish and maintain free public schools ...." Mo. CONST. art. IX, 1(a).
The North Dakota provision reads:
A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of
every voter in a government by the people being necessary in order to insure
the continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the
people, the legislative assembly shall make provision for the establishment and
maintenance of a system of public schools.
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147.
The Ohio Constitution of 1802 stated: "But religion, morality, and knowledge being
essentially necessary to the good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of instruction shall forever be encouraged by legislative provision, not inconsistent
with the rights of conscience." OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
The Rhode Island provision reads:
The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue, among the people, being
essential to the preservation of their rights and liberties, it shall be the duty of
the general assembly to promote public schools, and to adopt all means which
they may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the advantages
and opportunities of education.
R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
The Texas provision reads: "A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature
of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an
efficient system of public free schools." TEX. CONST. art. VIII, I I.
Massachusetts also served as an example for all of New England. The four Massachusetts
Bay Colony laws that established free public tax-supported compulsory schools became the
basis for legislation in all of the other New England colonies except Rhode Island. In 1650,
for example, Connecticut adopted the Massachusetts law of 1647 almost verbatim, whereas
in 1671, Plymouth Colony, which did not join Massachusetts until 1692, also adopted the
Massachusetts law. In 1680, New Hampshire adopted the Massachusetts law almost un-
changed; the state of Maine had identical laws as well because Maine was a part of Massa-
chusetts until 1820. Thus, early in the colonial period most New England states, following
the Massachusetts example, had firmly established the notion of state-mandated, state-su-
pervised, and tax-supported schools. CUBBERLY, supra note 409, at 20.
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fish their case for court-ordered reform: the fourteenth amend-
ment, the state's equal protection clause, and the state constitution's
provision on education. In assessing the viability of a constitutional
challenge to the Massachusetts system of financing schools, the ex-
periences of previous school finance plaintiffs in using each of these
factual and legal arguments may be useful.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Argument
The initial legal argument in school finance cases focused on
unequal school expenditures among a state's school districts. This
argument alleged that children from property-poor school districts
were required to attend a school that provided them with a lower
quality education because they lived in a poor area of the state. The
fourteenth amendment was a logical basis for plaintiffs to choose
to attack the legality of the state financing system that caused these
funding disparities because the legal definition of equal educational
opportunity had been defined, and had evolved, primarily through
United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fourteenth
amendment. In addition, by the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court had
made a number of decisions that seemed to indicate that the Court
would find unequal expenditures among a state's school districts
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment because the fi-
nance law did not confer equal educational benefits on all chil-
dren.454
The belief that the Supreme Court would hold unequal school
expenditures unconstitutional, however, rested on the assumption
that the right to a public education was "fundamental" under the
Federal Constitution, and that it was illegal to provide children
different educational benefits on the basis of the wealth of their
school district. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court rejected both of
these assumptions, and held that education was not a fundamental
right under the Federal Constitution, and that it was not illegal to
provide differing benefits or impose differing burdens on people
because of their wealth. A state's system of financing schools, the
Supreme Court held in this 1973 decision, would be presumed
constitutional unless it totally deprived a child of an education, or
failed to provide children with the minimum education needed to
454
	
supra notes 46-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of the evolution of
the concept of equality of educational opportunity under the fourteenth amendment.
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enjoy their right to free speech and to participate in the political
process. 455
In the years following the Rodriguez decision, plaintiffs in school
finance cases have continued to allege that their state's system of
funding schools violates the fourteenth amendment. All courts,
however, that have considered this issue through 1989, have either
rejected plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish their cases from Rodriguez,
or have chosen to make a ruling on some other legal ground. If
Massachusetts plaintiffs raised the fourteenth amendment argu-
ment, a different answer is unlikely. 456
In assessing the fourteenth amendment argument, for exam-
ple, one finds no evidence that any child in Massachusetts is being
totally deprived of an education. With regard to the issue of pro-
viding a minimum education, accreditation problems and student
failure of minimum competency tests may support an assertion that
the education children are receiving in some Massachusetts schools
is so deficient that they are unable to participate in the political
process or to exercise their right to free speech. If plaintiffs could
make this case, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
("SJC") would likely find that such a system would violate the state's
equal protection clause as well. In this situation, the SJC would
probably follow the approach used by all other courts confronting
fourteenth amendment arguments after Rodriguez, and choose to
decide the issue on the basis of the state constitution and avoid
Supreme Court review.'"
B. The State Equal Protection Argument
Following Rodriguei, school finance plaintiffs turned out of ne-
cessity to the state constitutional arena to seek court-ordered re-
form. One possible argument under the state constitution was that
unequal school expenditures violated the state's equal protection
clause. This two-part allegation followed the pattern of the four-
teenth amendment argument. Specifically, the plaintiffs would at-
tempt to invoke the usually fatal strict scrutiny of the court by
arguing that education is a fundamental right, or that differences
in per pupil expenditures among a state's school districts illegally
455 See supra notes 145-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rodriguez
decision.
456 See supra notes 216-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of previous cases in
which courts have rejected the fourteenth amendment argument.
4" See, e.g., the discussion of Robinson, supra notes 216-236.
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classify children on the basis of the suspect category of wealth. The
New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson, however, expressed concern
about both of these arguments, and following the 1973 decisions in
Robinson and Rodriguez, state equal protection arguments based on
wealth as a suspect category have been successful only in California,
Arkansas and Wyoming. The fundamental rights argument has
been successful since Rodriguez and Robinson only in California,
Connecticut and Wyoming. 458
In assessing the likelihood that the SJC would declare the Mas-
sachusetts system of financing schools unconstitutional on the basis
of the state's equal protection clause, it is clear that a statistical basis
exists for declaring that the current financing system discriminates
on the basis of the wealth of a school district. Massachusetts school
districts are heavily dependent on property tax revenue, but their
fiscal ability to raise funds based on property taxes varies enor-
mously. Even if the state legislature required all towns to tax at the
same rate for public school support, and devote the same amount
of their municipal budget to school support, the significant differ-
ence in property values among Massachusetts towns would still
result in differing amounts of money expended on education. 459
Although a statistical basis appears to exist to declare that the
Massachusetts system of financing schools illegally discriminates
against children from property-poor school districts, the SJC might
wish to avoid making a decision on this basis because of the impli-
cations that this decision might have for funding other services
provided by local governments. The vast majority of the courts that
have considered this "wealth as a suspect category" argument under
their state's equal protection clause have apparently agreed with the
New Jersey Supreme Court's observation in Robinson that wealth is
not at all, per se, a suspect basis for raising revenues. If the SJC
can base a decision on the constitutionality of the state's financing
system on any other grounds, it will likely follow the route taken
by most other courts and avoid holding that it is illegal to condition
a state benefit like education or welfare, or a state burden like
taxation, on the basis of wealth. 46°
45" See supra notes 237-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fundamental
rights argument after Robinson.
459
 See supra notes 373-408 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statistical
basis for a legal challenge to the current system of financing Massachusetts schools.
48°
	 supra notes 237-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts which have
considered wealth as a suspect category argument after Robinson.
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The issue of education as a fundamental right in Massachusetts,
on the other hand, presents fewer problems because of both the
nature of the argument and the unique history of education in
Massachusetts. In the first instance, for example, in arguing that a
right is fundamental, plaintiffs are essentially trying to demonstrate
that the right in question is so important and fundamental to the
individual, that it should be treated specially. Under this argument,
the state should not be allowed to interfere with this special right,
or deliver unequal services that affect this right, unless a compelling
reason exists for this interference or inequality. Thus, the funda-
mental rights argument does not necessarily imply that other ser-
vices provided by the government are "fundamental" if the right
that the plaintiffs seek to have declared fundamental can be distin-
guished from other state services or benefits. In addition, the fun-
damental rights argument will also likely present fewer problems
for the SJC in the Massachusetts case, because Massachusetts has
such a lengthy commitment to public education, and the emphasis
on education in the constitution is so strong, that education can
readily be distinguished from other services that the state has chosen
to provide.461
A Massachusetts school finance case could be formulated, for
example, that would bear a striking resemblance to successful fun-
damental rights cases in Connecticut and Wyoming. In Connecticut,
the Connecticut Supreme Court based its decision to declare edu-
cation a fundamental right in part on the state's lengthy commit-
ment to public education, dating from 1650.462 The Connecticut
Supreme Court also pointed to the legislature's recognition in other
contexts of the importance of each child receiving an equal oppor-
tunity for access to a suitable education program. In Massachusetts,
the state legislature has likewise recognized the importance of equal
educational opportunity in other contexts, most notably in chapter
70, where part of the stated purpose of this state funding statute
was to equalize educational opportunity. 463
In Wyoming, the court pointed to the basic importance of
education, as well as to its emphasis in the state constitution, in
concluding that education was a fundamental right that Wyoming
'6 ' See supra notes 409-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of
education in Massachusetts.
"2 Sec supra notes 257-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the school finance
case in Connecticut.
463 See supra notes 409-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of
education in Massachusetts.
September 19911	 SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM	 1173
was illegally conditioning on the wealth of a child's school district. 4"
Massachusetts parallels arise here as well, because the framers of
the Massachusetts Constitution apparently intentionally emphasized
education in the constitution. The education provision was appar-
ently the only place in the constitution that the legislature was
assigned an affirmative duty to act. Moreover, historians have
pointed out that it was unusual at the time that Massachusetts was
adopting its first constitution for state constitutions to make any
provision for public education at all.
In addition, as Jefferson's experience in Virginia illustrates, the
inclusion of a provision on education in the Massachusetts state
constitution was not an automatic gesture that was taken for
granted. In light of evidence that some opposition to the continued
public support of schools in Massachusetts arose in the western
districts, the inclusion of an education provision in the state consti-
tution is of added importance. Thus, ample reason exists for Mas-
sachusetts courts to consider education a fundamental right, and
the current financing system unconstitutional, because the system
does not distribute the benefits of education equally among all
child ren. 465
C. The State Education Provision Argument
The third legal argument that plaintiffs have used to challenge
the constitutionality of their state's funding plan has been to allege
that the financing system violates the education provision in the
state constitution. This fact-specific argument was successful in the
New Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, Kentucky, Montana and
Texas cases, and in fact has been the only successful argument in
the past seven years. Courts in these cases generally sought to define
the meaning of their respective provisions by examining the plain
meaning of the words, the context in which the provision was
passed, and the intent of the framers. These courts then assessed
whether factors such as unequal per pupil expenditures, lack of
guaranteed funding, and failure to apportion funds based on the
464 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the school finance
reform case in Wyoming, and the relative importance of education in the Massachusetts State
Constitution.
405 See supra notes 409-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of
education in Massachusetts.
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needs of children, violated their state constitution's education pro-
vision.466
In the case of Massachusetts, the current system of financing
schools results in substantial disparities in funding among the state's
school districts. The state legislature has already implicitly recog-
nized through chapter 70 that these funding disparities affect a
child's opportunity and ability to learn. The current system of fi-
nancing schools in Massachusetts also apparently leaves some school
districts, and the children they serve, without adequate and guar-
anteed funding to meet even minimum accreditation standards. In
addition, this system seems to penalize many children who have
high educational needs by funding their education at a lower level
than that of children in more affluent areas of the state. Unless one
assumes that a $60,000 difference in funds expended on a single
classroom makes no difference at all, one must conclude that in
Massachusetts the state is forcing children from property-poor
school districts to attend state-mandated public schools that are
inferior to those maintained in wealthier school districts. In doing
so, the state is arguably affecting their ability to achieve not only in
school, but in society as well.467
When one compares the results of this financing system with
the Massachusetts state provision on education, it is difficult not to
conclude that the current financing system violates this provision
and is thus unconstitutional. The plain meaning of the Massachu-
setts education provision, the intent of author John Adams, the
contemporary views of other state leaders, and the type of schooling
that existed when the education provision was passed in 1780, all
seem to indicate that the people of Massachusetts in ratifying this
provision intended to provide equal educational opportunity to all
children. Clearly, the current system of financing schools could not
be characterized, as John Hancock described Massachusetts schools
in the late 1700s, as providing "equal advantages to rich and
poor."468 The current financing system also seems incongruent with
the constitution's emphasis on virtue, or sacrificing for the public
good, and it is doubtful if the current educational system is diffusing
46" See supra notes 252-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state education
provision argument in other states.
467 See supra notes 373-408 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
unequal funding in Massachusetts.
468 See supra notes 435-39 for a discussion of John Adams view of public education at
the time the constitution was written.
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knowledge to all children in the manner anticipated by the framers
of the constitution.
In addition to these factors, the current system of financing
schools seems ill-prepared to serve the broad vital role for education
outlined in the constitution. A financing system in which school
districts have no guaranteed source of funds adequate to meet even
minimum accreditation standards is not likely to preserve liberties,
promote knowledge or inculcate social and moral values. Moreover,
in placing the duty to cherish and monitor education with the state,
it is unlikely that the framers of this provision intended to allow
voters within a school district the option to fund their schools in-
adequately. Indeed, the entire tradition of education in Massachu-
setts prior to the adoption of the state constitution, as well as edu-
cation as it existed when the constitution was adopted, points to an
intent that the state ensure that towns maintain schools that are
sufficiently funded to meet the educational goals stated in the con-
stitution. In writing this education provision, John Adams could
not have intended to promote a system of education that discrimi-
nated against children in poor areas of the state, provided an in-
ferior education to those children with the greatest educational
needs, and allowed local voters to choose to provide a less than
adequate education for children living in their town. 469
Thus, the SJC could hold that the current system of financing
public schools in Massachusetts is unconstitutional on two potential
bases. Both the lengthy commitment to public education in Massa-
chusetts, and the emphasis on education in the state constitution,
seem to provide ample reason for the SJC to elevate education to
the status of a fundamental right. Such a designation would place
the burden on the state to demonstrate why it should be allowed to
condition the quality of a child's education on the wealth of his or
her school district. Assuming that the state of Massachusetts invokes
the "local control argument" used in other school finance cases, the
SJC would likely hold that the state could meet the goal of local
control of schools in other ways, and thus declare the Massachusetts
system of financing schools unconstitutional. 47°
An alternate basis on which the SJC could declare the current
system of financing schools unconstitutional would appear to be the
469 See supra notes 409-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of
education in Massachusetts.
"° See supra notes 409-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of
education in Massachusetts.
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state's education provision. The current system of financing schools
does not provide equality of educational opportunity for Massachu-
setts schoolchildren, which seems to have been the intent of the
people of Massachusetts in ratifying this provision. The current
financing system also provides an inferior education to some of the
state's neediest children, which would seem to be inconsistent with
the attainment of the broad societal goals that the Massachusetts
education provision envisions. The current school system arguably
does not diffuse knowledge in the manner the framers intended,
given the broad role the framers envisioned for education. Finally,
the current system of financing schools leaves local voters free to
provide inadequate funding for public schools, a situation that
clearly seems to contradict the very reason that the people of Mas-
sachusetts assigned the duty to cherish the schools to the state, and
not to towns. 471
VII. CONCLUSION
The legal fight to achieve equality of educational opportunity
for all children has spanned nearly a century, and has involved
differing interpretations of this concept. One focus of the move-
ment to achieve equality of educational opportunity has been to
reduce the significant funding disparities that exist among a state's
school districts when states choose to fund their schools partially
through local property tax revenue. Those who believe that differ-
ences in the amount of money spent per child on education affect
the quality of education the child receives have sought court-or-
dered reform of the funding plans which led to these differences.
Since 1968, when the first school finance case was decided,
courts have considered the constitutionality of the state financing
systems of twenty-eight states. School finance reform plaintiffs have
argued that unequal funding among a state's school districts was
unconstitutional on the basis of the fourteenth amendment, the
state equal protection clause and the state education provision. Prior
to 1989, however, the school finance reform movement was only
moderately successful, and interest in court-ordered school reform
seemed to be declining. Then, in 1989, within weeks of each other,
courts in three states declared their respective state financing plans
unconstitutional on the basis of their state education provision. In
4" See supra notes 409-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of
education in Massachusetts.
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the following year, another court declared its system of financing
schools unconstitutional because it failed to meet the needs of dis-
advantaged children in certain court-identified urban school dis-
tricts, and failed to provide adequate guaranteed funds for pro-
grams in these districts. By 1991, there was evidence of a revived
interest in court-ordered school finance reform.
Massachusetts is one of twenty-two states in which courts have
not yet ruled on the constitutionality of the state's system of financ-
ing schools. Statistically, the current system seems vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge because there is a substantial difference in
per pupil expenditures among the state's school districts, arguably
a lack of sufficient guaranteed funding to ensure a minimum edu-
cation for all children, and a failure to apportion funds based on
the educational needs of children. Legally, it seems likely that plain-
tiffs could make a strong case that the current system of financing
schools in Massachusetts violates the state's equal protection clause,
as well as the state's constitutional provision on education. If Mas-
sachusetts is confronted with a legal challenge to the constitution-
ality of its system of financing schools, an ample statistical and
constitutional basis exists for the Supreme Judicial Court to declare
the Massachusetts system of financing schools unconstitutional.
KATE STRICKLAND, PH.D.
